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RADIOACTIVE VETERANS: A NEW LOOK AT THE
NUCLEAR HISTORY OF AMERICA
Craig M. Kabatchnick*, P. Michelle Fitzsimmons** & Jonathan
B. Kelly***
“We are all students of history, a search for the truth through
extensive research and writings, but we are also in the
process of becoming a part of history. You can never ask
more from life. We will all be leaving behind a legacy for
those who follow behind us.”1
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* This article is dedicated to my wife Ruth, my daughter Rebecca
Ashley Kabatchnick, my mother-in-law Lilian Fink, a survivor of
World War II in Birmingham, England, and Robert Luskin; who have
stood by my side and supported me at all times throughout my life and
taught me to never quit, and that we may not at times have it all
together, but together we have it all.
Professor Craig M. Kabatchnick is Director of the Veterans Law
Program at North Carolina Central University School of Law, where he
teaches Veterans Law Clinic I & II. From 1984 to 1990 he practiced
with his late father Neil B. Kabatchnick, before the Boards for
Correction of Military Records within the various military departments
in matters involving administrative military personnel law. He coauthored an article entitled Practice Before the Boards for Correction of
Military Records Within the Various Military Departments, 33 FED. BAR
NEWS & J. 17, 17–21, 44 (cited as a reference in 10 U.S.C. §1552a).
Professor Kabatchnick represented the United States Department of
Veteran Affairs from 1990 to 1995 as an Appellate Attorney, Senior
Appellate Attorney and Associate Special Assistant on the Appellate
Litigation Staff Group, Office of the General Counsel, United States
Department of Veterans Affairs before the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims in over 300 cases. From 1995 to present
he has advocated for veterans rights and played a critical role in the
VA claims adjudication process. Professor Kabatchnick has written
FOUR other articles for the Marquette Elder’s Advisor: PSTD and Its
Effects on Elderly, Minority, and Female Veterans, 10 MARQ. ELDER’S
ADVISOR 269 (2009); The TBI Impact: The Truth About Traumatic Brain
Injuries and Their Indeterminate Effects on Elderly, Minority, and Female
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“The truth of the matter is that you always know the right
thing to do. The hard part is doing it.”2

I. HISTORY
A. BACKGROUND
In a personal letter dated August 2, 1939 from his home in
Long Island, New York, Albert Einstein wrote to President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, and stated as follows:
Some recent work by E. Fermi and L. Szilard, which has
been communicated to me in manuscript, leads me to
expect that the element uranium may be turned into a
new and important source of energy in the immediate
future. Certain aspects of the situation which has
arisen seem to call for watchfulness and, if necessary,
quick action on the part of the Administration. I
believe therefore that it is my duty to bring to your
attention the following facts and recommendations:
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1. Professor Craig M. Kabatchnick.
2. General Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr.
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Veterans of All Wars, 11 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 81 (2009); Obstacles
Faced by the Elderly Veteran in the VA Claims Adjudication Process, 12
MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 185 (2010); and Unsung Survivors: VA Advocacy
for the Spouses, Widows, and Children of Elderly Veterans, 13 MARQ.
ELDER’S ADVISOR 243 (2012).
Special thanks to North Carolina Central University School of Law
Veterans Law Program clinical students Joshua E. Byrd, Sophia V. King
and Krystle Avecedo.
** P. Michelle Fitzsimmons is a registered patent attorney who
counsels clients in intellectual property matters and FDA regulations.
Dr. Fitzsimmons earned her Ph.D. in Inorganic Chemistry from Wake
Forest University, where her doctoral research focused on the synthesis
and characterization of metal complexes for use in nuclear medicine.
Dr. Fitzsimmons is licensed to practice law in North Carolina, the
United States Federal Court- Middle District of North Carolina, and
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
*** Jonathan Kelly is an attorney specializing in the representation
of disabled veterans. Kelly is licensed in the State of New York and
admitted to practice before the Veterans’ Affairs Office of the General
Counsel and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.
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In the course of the last four months it has been made
probable – through the work of Joliot in France as well
as Fermi and Szilard in America – that it may become
possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large
mass of uranium, by which vast amounts of power and
large quantities of new radium-like elements would be
generated. Now it appears almost certain that this
could be achieved in the immediate future.
This new phenomenon would also lead to the
construction of bombs, and it is conceivable – though
much less certain – that extremely powerful bombs of a
new type may thus be constructed. A single bomb of
this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might
very well destroy the whole port together with some of
the surrounding territory. However, such bombs might
very well prove to be too heavy for transportation by
air.
The United States has only very poor ores of uranium
in moderate quantities. There is some good ore in
Canada and the former Czechoslovakia, while the most
important source of uranium is Belgian Congo.
In view of this situation you may think it desirable to
have some permanent contact maintained between the
Administration and the group of physicists working on
chain reactions in America. One possible way of
achieving might be for you to entrust with this task a
person who has your confidence and who could
perhaps serve in an inofficial [sic] capacity. His task
might comprise the following:
a) to approach Government Departments, keep them
informed of the further development, and put forward
recommendations for Government action, giving
particular attention to the problem of securing a supply
of uranium ore for the United States;
b) to speed up the experimental work, which is at
present being carried on within the limits of the
budgets of University laboratories, by providing funds,
if such funds be required, through his contacts with
private persons who are willing to make contributions
for this cause, and perhaps also by obtaining the cooperation of industrial laboratories which have the
necessary equipment.
I understand that Germany has actually stopped the
sale of uranium from the Czechoslovakian mines which
she has taken over. That she should have taken such
early action might perhaps be understood on the
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ground that the son of the German Under-Secretary of
State, von Weizsäcker, is attached to the KaiserWilhelm-Institut [sic] in Berlin where some of the
American work on uranium is now being repeated.3
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3. Letter from Albert Einstein (with Leo Szilard), to President Franklin
Roosevelt (Aug. 2, 1939) (on file at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Museum),
available at http://media.nara.gov/Public_Vaults/00762_.pdf.
4. Unless otherwise footnoted all the information in this historical section
comes from two related sources: OLIVER STONE & PETER KUZNICK, THE UNTOLD
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 87–226 (2012) and Oliver Stone’s Untold History of the
United States (Showtime television series, 2012).
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Thus, with this single letter from Dr. Albert Einstein to
President Franklin Roosevelt, dated just one day after the
German invasion of Poland and the subsequent start of World
War II, the race to build the first atomic bomb began.4 In
December 1938, a chemist in a German laboratory made a
discovery, which would culminate to the creation and use of two
nuclear bombs on Japanese civilian populations in August 1945
(Hiroshima and Nagasaki) both of which had no military value
whatsoever at that time. Within ten months, the world would
become engulfed in World War II, a “total war,” whereupon
Germany, led by a ruthless dictator, Adolph Hitler, would
control, except for Great Britain, the entire Western and Eastern
Europe portions of the European continent by 1940, and
subsequently the Soviet Union in 1941-1942. The 1938 discovery
by a German chemist in Nazi Germany that a uranium atom
would split in two when placed next to radioactive material
would begin a nuclear arms race; the initial purpose being to
deny Nazi Germany and Adolph Hitler military dominance over
the entire world.
This race to build the first atomic bomb, the most
formidable weapon ever known to mankind, a weapon that
would eventually threaten the very existence of every country in
the world, would involve the world’s greatest chemists and
scientists.
By 1942, many major cities had been bombed. Initially,
General Curtis LeMay’s bombing strategy included the
industrial targets in the heartland of Germany, but at a great cost
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to the American bomber pilots. It was in 1943 that General
LeMay and British General Arthur “Bomber” Harris started the
indiscriminate use of American daylight bombing, along with
British bombing at night, against German civilian centers. In the
summer of 1943, the Americans and the British bombed and
destroyed the city of Hamburg. Later that year, the German city
of Munster was bombed and destroyed. In February 1945, the
city of Dresden was completely destroyed by British and
American bombings.
Dresden had little military value;
however, it is estimated that more than 500,000 German civilians
died as a result of the bombing. By mid-April 1944 there was
little military value left in bombing Germany, and it was also
known to American intelligence that the Germans had stopped
their atomic bomb program in favor of the V-1 flying bomb and
V-2 rocket projects.
The war with Germany ended with their surrender on May
8, 1945. But the American hatred toward Japan was exhibited
with great ferocity after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Further
hatred toward the Japanese people was exacerbated by reports
in 1944 of Japanese atrocities against American and British
Prisoners of War (POWs) during the Philippine death march,
and in many other instances.
In late 1944, General LeMay transferred to Japan and started
a campaign of indiscriminate “terror” bombings of Japanese
civilian centers, similar to the practice he had initiated in allied
bombings of Germany in World War II. In March of 1945 the
Allied forces were capturing more and more Japanese occupied
territories, thus bringing Allied bombers that much closer to the
Japanese mainland. In March 1945 General LeMay ordered 330
bombers to attack Tokyo with incendiary bombs, white
phosphorous, and other flammable material.
This was
devastating to the city because there were large amounts of
bamboo and wood throughout Tokyo. That raid killed more
than 100,000 civilians, while leaving another one million
homeless. The Allied Air Force firebombed at least 100 other
targets in Japan, some with no military significance; these raids
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killed an additional 500,000 Japanese. Yet, the Japanese would
not surrender under “unconditional” terms, fearing the loss of
their Emperor Hirohito.
Given the terrible costs of General LeMay’s “terror”
bombings of civilian targets, the atomic bomb seemed to be the
logical next step in trying to force the Japanese into
unconditional surrender. The atomic bomb constructed and
successfully tested on July 16, 1945, was, in fact, a prototype of
what was to come in the future.
Key facts led to President Truman’s decision to utilize the
atomic bomb. In May 1945, in taking over the island of Iwo Jima
after five weeks of combat, the United States lost over 7,000
soldiers, while another 18,000 were wounded. Furthermore, at
Okinawa, after 82 days of combat and what was the bloodiest
battle of the Pacific War, over 12,000 Americans were killed
and/or missing and 36,000 were wounded. The Japanese lost
over 100,000 troops and an equivalent number of civilians while
defending this island. Another key fact leading to the use of the
atomic bomb was the sinking of the USS Indianapolis, which
resulted in a dreadful loss of life when the ship was secretly
returning to the Philippines after delivering the components of
the atomic bomb to the island of Tinian.
In this regard, in the summer of 1945 it was President
Truman’s firm belief that, although the Japanese were essentially
defeated from a military perspective, any invasion of the main
islands by American forces would still result in the loss of
hundreds of thousands of American lives. Furthermore, many
world and American military leaders, including Churchill and
Truman, believed that the Soviet Union represented an even
bigger threat. The use of the atomic bomb would be an
extraordinary show of strength, one that changed the face of the
world.
Under the leadership of Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, the
Manhattan Project, which involved many of the world’s top
physicists, scientists, and chemists, working together in Chicago,
Illinois and Los Alamos, New Mexico, secretly completed the
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construction of the atomic bomb. This successful construction
and detonation of the first atomic bomb, a plutonium implosion
bomb, was completed on July 16, 1945, at the Los Alamos test
site in New Mexico, at a site code named Trinity.
In July 1945, the three major allied powers, the United
States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, were to meet at
Potsdam, Germany to determine the future status of post-war
Europe. President Truman delayed the Potsdam Conference for
two weeks, in hopes of hearing the positive outcome of the July
16 Trinity blast at Los Alamos. Upon hearing the news of the
successful blast at the Trinity test site at Los Alamos, President
Truman immediately notified British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill and Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. Stalin was shocked
and furious, for his intelligence had only informed him that the
United States was in the process of constructing a nuclear bomb,
not of its completion and subsequent successful test shot. This
marked the start of the nuclear arms race between the United
States and the Soviet Union; an arms race that gave countries the
ability to develop such a formidable weapon, with a capacity to
grant any country a vast capability of military dominance over
the entire world, and thereby introduce the world’s most
devastating manmade weapon.
During the course of World War II President Harry Truman
repeatedly reiterated President Roosevelt’s original call for the
unconditional surrender of the Imperial Japanese forces.
However, on July 16, 1945, after the successful test shot at
Trinity, President Truman had a new weapon that could destroy
entire cities, and beyond. It was hoped by Truman that the use
of such a bomb would force the Japanese into unconditional
surrender.
On August 1, 1945, the Soviet Union invaded northern
Manchuria and northern Japan. Then, on August 5, 1945, the
Soviet Union declared war on Japan. The main fear for the
Japanese was that under the terms of unconditional surrender
they would lose their Emperor Hirohito, who was the equivalent
of a god to the Japanese people. However, President Truman
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would ultimately decide that use of the atomic bomb would end
the war on American terms, and that he wanted it done as soon
as possible in the face of the Soviet Union’s declaration of war
against the Japanese. President Truman wanted a swift end to
war and a decisive end to the war with Japan.
Therefore, on the morning of August 6, 1945, at 8:15 a.m.,
with great secrecy, a single American B-29 bomber named the
“Enola Gay” dropped a single uranium bomb, “Little Boy,”
which contained the equivalent of 20,000 tons of trinitrotoluene
(TNT), on the city of Hiroshima, Japan. Hiroshima was selected
as the first of three sites for the use of the atomic bomb because it
had not previously been bombed and was not of any military
significance. In an instant Hiroshima was destroyed, killing at
least 70,000 people. In addition, there were an estimated 100,000
civilians who would die of wounds, burns, and radiation
exposure. In many instances it would be years, and even
decades, before thousands of people would die of radiation
poisoning resulting from exposure to that atomic bomb.
President Truman, in his first radio address, described the
first atomic bomb and its impact on the city of Hiroshima.
President Truman further stated that the war started as a result
of the Japanese bombing at Pearl Harbor, and that they had been
repaid manifold. He stated that the atomic bomb exhibited the
harnessing power of the universe.
Yet, the Japanese government still refused to surrender.
Therefore on August 9, 1945, at Tinian, a B-29 was loaded with
the second atomic bomb, nicknamed “Fat Man,” a plutonium
implosion bomb, similar to the bomb successfully tested at Los
Alamos. The second target was to be the city of Kokura and the
backup target was Nagasaki. As with Hiroshima, both cities
were chosen because they were untouched by American
bombing and had little military value. Therefore, consistent
with General LeMay’s long-standing belief in “terror bombings,”
both atomic bombings of the Japanese civilian population were
deliberately targeted for shock effect. Cloud cover obscured
Kokura, the primary target site, and the B-29 carrying the second
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5. DEF. NUCLEAR AGENCY, DEP’T OF DEF., DNA 6014F, OPERATION UPSHOTKNOTHOLE 66, 76–77 (1953); Frank Munger, Atomic Vet Recalls 1946 Bomb Tests – and
Dirty Aftermath, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 2008,
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2008/sep/21/atomic-vet-recalls/.
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atomic bomb faced anti-aircraft fire. Therefore, the destiny of
Nagasaki, the backup target site, was sealed.
Fat Man exploded over Nagasaki with the force of 22,000
tons of TNT, larger than the Hiroshima bomb, and instantly
killed at least 40,000 people. Furthermore, tens of thousands of
Japanese civilians were fatally wounded, while others died of
radiation poisoning. Thereafter, the Japanese surrendered on
August 15, 1945. Thus, the nuclear arms race between the
United States and the Soviet Union gained momentum, which
would forever change the fate of the world in which we live. On
August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union successfully exploded their
first atomic bomb, an exact duplicate of the American plutonium
implosion bomb, Little Boy, tested at test site Trinity, with a
force of 20,000 tons of TNT. The Americans detected the Soviet
test blast when an American aircraft flying over the Western
Pacific detected high levels of radiation in the atmosphere. This
single atomic test blast by the Soviet Union seriously expanded
the Cold War in 1949. This was best exemplified by American
development and successful test of the hydrogen bomb in the
Pacific on November 1, 1952. The hydrogen bomb exploded
with the force of ten megatons, equivalent to ten million tons of
TNT (more than 500 times more powerful than the first atomic
bomb that destroyed Hiroshima).
The United States would conduct numerous atomic blasts
between 1946 and 1962. Several of these atomic blasts were
conducted in the Western Pacific, most especially: the Bikini and
Marshall Islands, the Nevada Test Site, Camp Desert Rock, and
in Alaska. Soldiers were ordered to charge towards detonated
nuclear bombs to assess troop maneuverability, and battleship
and airplane readiness were tested with both underwater and
atmospheric nuclear detonations.5 Thus, in the interest of
national security and military strategy, the U.S. military trained
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6. See U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, THE EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC
BOMBINGS OF HIROSHIMA & NAGASAKI 30–41 (1946), available at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/document
s/pdfs/65.pdf.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., ERNEST A. PINSON ET AL., PROJECT 2.66A, OPERATION REDWING
PACIFIC PROVING GROUNDS – PRELIMINARY REPORT, EARLY CLOUD PENETRATIONS
(1956), available at http://www.hss.energy.gov/healthsafety/ihs/marshall/
collection/data/ihp1c/0898_a.pdf; DEF. NUCLEAR AGENCY, supra note 5, at 66, 76–77.
9. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR TESTS JULY 1945 THROUGH
SEPTEMBER 1992 viii (2000).
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with nuclear bombs between 1945 and 1962. Nuclear bombs are
different from traditional bombs that relied on chemical
reactions like TNT6 – as nuclear bombs generate nuclear wind
gusts, excessive heat, radiation, and other environmental
phenomena.7 For this reason, the U.S. military had to learn how
to use nuclear weapons in the traditional arenas of war,
including land, air, and sea.8 These missions were used to
“determine the effects of nuclear detonations on military
offensive and defensive systems.”9 These nuclear tests exposed
thousands of veterans in a reckless fashion to lethal amounts of
radiation, with the support of very few accurate or reliable
radiation dosemetry badges or devices, and with reckless
disregard to the dangers of lethal radiation exposure, either due
to the radiation blast itself or radiation fallout thereafter.
During Operation “Crossroads” in 1946, the United States
conducted both an atmospheric blast as well as an underwater
test blast. These two blasts were identified as Shot “Able” and
Shot “Baker.” Numerous naval vessels and naval personnel
participated in Operation Crossroads. The water in and around
the Bikini Islands and Bikini Atoll was highly contaminated with
radiation; and, the ballast utilized on the ships contained this
highly contaminated water. Moreover, when sea water was
sprayed on the ships, the puddles of water that gathered on the
ship were contaminated with radioactive isotopes. Yet, ships
were allowed to travel into Bikini Atoll just twenty hours after
the nuclear blast, exposing thousands of naval personnel to
excessive amounts of lethal radiation. Tragically, the radioactive
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fallout from Shot Able and Shot Baker in the Bikini Islands
during Operation Crossroads was so lethal and extensive that
the innocent residents of those islands had to be evacuated
permanently. The former residents of the Bikini Islands would
later be compensated due to the fact that they were displaced by
the radioactive exposure and fallout caused by Shot Able and
Shot Baker during Operation Crossroads.
The numerous Nevada nuclear test blasts in the 1950s
created their own set of problems for military personnel. The
sites of the atomic test blasts were located in Nevada, which is
by its very nature extremely dry, and therefore, many of the
atomic test blasts were labeled “dirty blasts.” The inherent risks
of releasing large amounts of ionized dust particles into the
atmosphere during the Nevada atomic test blasts were quite
high, exposing cities, local towns, and communities to lethal
amounts of radioactive fallout, thus resulting in higher rates of
cancer, and other diseases linked to radiation exposure. The
classic example of the effects of fallout on a civilian population
was Shot “Harry.” The intent of the military during Shot Harry
was to avoid fallout hitting Salt Lake City and Las Vegas. Shot
Harry turned out to be a dirty blast, with a vast amount of
ionized dust particles shooting up into the atmosphere. That
fallout headed straight toward St. George, Utah, where a wind
shear brought the fallout straight over and down onto the city
with tragic consequences. At the time of Shot Harry, residents
of St. George, Utah remember seeing a “pink cloud” over the
city. In the future, cancer clusters developed throughout the
population of St. George, Utah, resulting in litigation against the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).
Veterans who served in the Nevada and West Pacific
nuclear test blasts were treated by the military without much
sophistication or science. Despite their exposure to lethal doses
of radiation, little attention was paid to their future well being.
For example, to test exposure to nuclear blasts, the military
merely placed houses, buildings of adobe, and pigs—whose skin
is similar to humans—in the vicinity of the Nevada test sites.
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10. NAT. NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/NV – 764,
CAMP DESERT ROCK (2011).
11. Id. at 1.
12. Id. at 1–2.
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In addition, veterans were ordered to stand in close
proximity to the test site and ordered to stare at the stem of the
blast, such as in “Upshot-Knothole,” Shot “Badger,” and Shot
“Grable” in area Five of the Nevada nuclear test-site on May 23,
1953. These and other veterans were ordered to squat or stand
in shallow slit trenches and then to charge the stem of the
nuclear blast. They were ordered to remain at the test site for
days after the initial nuclear test blast, forcing them to eat food
and remain in quarters contaminated with ionized dust
particles.
They oftentimes wore the same uniforms
contaminated with ionized dust particles for numerous days.
At Camp Desert Rock in Nevada the U.S. military began
using smaller atomic blasts to learn how to fight a nuclear war.
On April 22, 1952, approximately 2,000 Army personnel
conducted maneuvers beneath the mushroom cloud of the Shot
“Charlie” nuclear detonation. The 31-kiloton explosion was one
of the largest ever conducted in Nevada to that date. The United
States government provided few basic precautions to protect
military personnel from the lethal effects of the nuclear tests.
These active duty military personnel were, in all respects, being
handled as human guinea pigs. It was the goal of the military to
deduce whether U.S. troops could fight and survive an atomic
attack.10
In this regard, in the 1950’s the Nevada National Security
Site was the site for a large military camp containing thousands
of young active duty military personnel, including marines,
naval personnel, soldiers, and air force military personnel. They
were to witness the heat and blast of the ultimate “doomsday
weapon,”11 with little thought as to the lethal radiological health
risks and overall safety of these soldiers, who were exposed
directly to lethal amounts of radiation.12
Camp Desert Rock was activated in the fall of 1951 for the
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Between 1945 and 1962, several thousand service members
were involved in nuclear weapons training missions14 wherein
live nuclear bombs or “shots” were detonated.15 This class
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13. Id.
14. EMP. EDUC. SYS., DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VETERANS & RADIATION 43,
141 (2001).
15. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 9 (“This document lists
chronologically and alphabetically by name all nuclear tests and simultaneous
detonations conducted by the United States from July 1945 through September
1992.”).
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“Buster-Jangle” series of nuclear blasts. These blasts were
conducted in Yucca Flats, Nevada. These nuclear test blasts
involved an atmospheric blast. Thousands of troop observers
from all parts of the United States were deployed from Camp
Desert Rock to witness, at close range, the atomic detonations.
Incredibly, after the atomic explosions, some of the participating
troops were marched or bused even closer to “ground zero” to
see the effects of these atomic explosions on military equipment
before returning to Camp Desert Rock.13
After discharge from active duty military service, many
veterans developed forms of cancer and disease for which the
government had not made adequate resources and care
available. And in a very real way, the fallout from these blasts
continues today.
This article is dedicated to the thousands of veterans who
participated in these nuclear test blasts from 1940 through 1970.
These veterans participated in one of the greatest battles of alltime—the Cold War between the United States, the Soviet
Union, and China. This article is the story of the inherent risks
and sacrifices that veterans of the atomic test blasts made during
their participation in the atomic arms race during the height of
the Cold War. And now, subsequent to these atomic test blasts,
modern warfare has been revolutionized and a new race, a race
to keep the world’s most destructive detonation from any
intending nation or group, has been birthed.
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AN ATOMIC VETERAN? (2012).
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17. COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE DOSE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM OF THE
DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, A REVIEW OF THE DOSE RECONSTRUCTION
PROGRAM OF THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY 33–34 (2003), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309089026 [hereinafter REVIEW OF
DTRA].
18. See Glyn G. Caldwell et al., Leukemia Among Participants in Military
Maneuvers at a Nuclear Bomb Test, 244 JAMA 1575, 1577–78 (1980) [hereinafter
Caldwell et al., Leukemia]. See also SUSAN THAUL ET AL., INST. OF MED., THE FIVE
SERIES STUDY: MORTALITY OF MILITARY PARTICIPANTS IN U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TESTS 9 (2000), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=9697, for a
review of government funded entities.
19. See Judi Hasson, Getting the Word Out to Atomic Veterans Exposed to
Radiation, AARP, Nov. 8, 2011, http://www.aarp.org/health/conditionstreatments/info-11-2011/atomic-veterans-special-benefits-radiation-exposure.html.
20. Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (codified in part at 38 U.S.C. § 1154 (2000)).
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joined other soldiers involved with the atomic bombing missions
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, the American POWs held in
these cities, and soldiers who served during the Japanese
occupation, as victims of radiation exposure.16 These “Atomic
Veterans,” numbering over 400,000, were exposed to radiation
either from the initial bomb blast, breathing the radioactive dust,
ingesting contaminated food and water after the blast, or living
in the radioactive environment.17
Epidemiological studies initiated in the late 1970s revealed
that these Atomic Veterans were at an increased risk of
developing a variety of cancers and chronic diseases, including
leukemia.18 However, veterans suffering from radiological
diseases found it difficult to obtain medical benefits from the
Veterans Administration (VA).19 In response to public sentiment
and pressure from veterans groups Congress passed the
Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation
Standards Act (VDRECSA),20 acknowledging that some veterans
were exposed to ionizing radiation, and that this exposure could
be linked to radiological diseases. Unfortunately, few veterans
have been able to receive compensation under this Act,
provoking Congress to pass additional legislation to help
compensate these veterans, including the Radiation-Exposed
Veterans Compensation Act of 1988 (REVCA) and the Radiation
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Exposure Compensation Act of 1990 (RECA).21 The current
legislation provides Atomic Veterans, who suffer from a few
specific radiological diseases, an avenue for compensation.
However, obtaining medical benefits for veterans who suffer
from radiological diseases not specifically outlined in the
legislation continues to prove difficult.22 This article reviews the
legal and scientific challenges veterans face in establishing
service-connected disability compensation for their radiological
diseases, suggests a new standard, and provides a case study in
which a veteran was finally awarded VA benefits for his
radiological diseases after decades of litigation.
II. THE SPECIAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE ATOMIC VETERAN
The nuclear bombs dropped in 1945 on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
exhibited the most awesome display of military power in
recorded history. Witnesses described a bright white-blue light
and a concussive blast, followed by a ring of fire and extreme
heat that incinerated thousands and devastated the cities’
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21. Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100321, 102 Stat. 485 [OR] Pub. L. No. 100-322, 102 Stat. 534 (1988) (codified at 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.309(d) (2011) and as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (2006)). Radiation Exposure
Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (2006) (amended 2000). The current
version of RECA is officially entitled The Radiation Exposure Compensation Act
Amendments of 2000, however, for colloquial ease the amended Act is still referred
to as RECA.
22. See, e.g., Veterans’ Health Care Improvements Act of 1998: Hearing on S. 1385
and S. 1822 Before the S. Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of
Dr. Rosalie Bertell, Int’l Inst. of Concern for Pub. Health); PowerPoint: Bradley
Flohr & Gail Berry, Slide Presentation, Radiation Claims Processing at the VETERANS’
ADVISORY BOARD ON DOSE RECONSTRUCTION MEETING (Mar. 23, 2012), slides 4–5,
available at http://www.vbdr.org/meetings/2012/Presentations/6-Flohr_VBDR_
Mar12.pdf [hereinafter Flohr 2012]; PowerPoint: Bradley B. Flohr, Slide
Presentation, Update on VA Radiation Claims Compensation Program for Veterans at the
VETERANS’ ADVISORY BOARD ON DOSE RECONSTRUCTION MEETING (Mar. 11, 2011),
slides 6–7, available at http://www.vbdr.org/meetings/2011/presentations/Flohr.pdf
[hereinafter Flohr 2011] (stating that 1,968 claims were granted and 3,683 were
denied); PowerPoint: Bradley B. Flohr, Slide Presentation, Update on VA Radiation
Claims Compensation Program for Veterans at the VETERANS’ ADVISORY BOARD ON
DOSE RECONSTRUCTION MEETING (Mar. 11, 2011), slides 6–7, available at
http://www.vbdr.org/meetings/2010/presentations/Flohr_VBDR_Update_March_20
10.pdf [hereinafter Flohr 2010] (stating that 1,648 claims were granted and 2,918
claims were denied).
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23. See U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, supra note 6, at 3–4.
24. Id. at 16–27. See also PAUL S. HENSHAW & AUSTIN M. BRUES, ATOMIC BOMB
CASUALTY COMM., GENERAL REPORT 3 (1947); and JOHN HERSEY, HIROSHIMA 87–118
(1946).
25. See, e.g., Stuart C. Finch, Acute Radiation Syndrome, 258 JAMA 664, 664–65
(1987). See generally STUART FINCH ET AL., ATOMIC BOMB CAS. COMM’N, DETECTION
OF LEUKEMIA & RELATED DISORDERS, HIROSHIMA & NAGASAKI: RESEARCH PLAN
(1965).
26. See UNIV. OF WASH. ENVTL. HEALTH & SAFETY, PRINCIPLES OF RADIATION
PROTECTION Bio-3 (2006).
27. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2011).
28. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) (2006).
29. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311 (2011).
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infrastructure.23 These nuclear weapons not only demonstrated
the military prowess of the United States, but also symbolized
the beginning of modern nuclear science and concerns regarding
radiation exposure. Many survivors of the initiation blast soon
succumbed to a mysterious illness, called “radiation sickness,”
characterized by: nausea, vomiting, headache, dizziness, fatigue,
fever, and skin burns.24 Through these observations, scientists
and medical professionals became aware of the unique and
immediate effects of radiation exposure.25 However, the longterm effects of radiation were largely unknown.26
Once these Atomic Veterans developed radiation-related
diseases they turned to the VA to provide them with medical
care. However, to receive care a veteran must prove that his/her
condition is service-connected.27 Generally, this requires that
there be a nexus between a disease and radiation exposure.28 In
determining this nexus the VA must consider several factors:
probable radiation dose, tissues or organs affected, veterans’
age, gender and family history, time-lapse between exposure
and disease onset, and any non-service related activity that may
have contributed to the development of the disease.29
Regrettably, scientists and veterans have difficulty linking
radiological diseases to radiation exposure incurred during
military service. This difficulty can be attributed to several
factors, including: (1) the lack of knowledge and the inability to
measure radiation exposure during the mission; (2)
misinformation communicated to the veteran and the public

33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 11 Side A

07/02/2013 13:56:24

PUBLISHED.KABATCHNICK.MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

RADIOACTIVE VETERANS

6/17/2013 5:29 PM

157

about radiation exposure; (3) the oath of secrecy sworn by
soldiers prohibiting them from discussing their radiation
exposure with their physicians; (4) the long “incubation period”
with which many radiological diseases are associated; (5) the
difficulty associated with retrospectively calculating radiation
exposure dose; and (6) the variability of radiation exposure
experienced by veterans, which complicates the scientific
analysis of linking specific diseases with specific types of
radiation.30
Unfortunately, in the absence of direct scientific data
establishing a “cause-and-effect” relationship between radiation
exposure and radiological disease, the VA has historically
denied service-connected compensation for this class of injury.31
Even though Congress has enacted various legislation to compel
the VA and the DOJ to award radiation exposure benefits to
Atomic Veterans who suffer from certain radiological diseases,
including VDRECSA and REVCA, compensation remains
extremely limited.32 This is largely because, with the exception
of delineated “presumptive diseases,”33 Atomic Veterans must
still prove a nexus between an in-service injury or disease and a
current disability.
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30. See discussion infra Sections III, IV.
31. Prior to VDRECSA and subsequent legislation, the only option available to
the veteran was a claim filed for direct service-connection, under 38 U.S.C. Sections
1110, 1154(a) and 38 C.F.R. Section 3.303. For radiogenic disease claims, the veteran
had to show that the disease resulted from in-service exposure to ionizing radiation.
Veterans and their survivors who attempted to establish direct service-connection
were seldom successful under that regime because of the severe difficulties of
proof, including the lack of ready access to scientific and medical evidence about
the long-term effects of radiation exposure and the lack of reliable information
about exposure levels. In addition, there was great inconsistency in the way
radiogenic-disease claims were addressed by the agency's various regional offices.
See H.R. Rep. No. 98-592, at 7 (1984) reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4449, 4453; 130
Cong. Rec. 13,147-49 (1984) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
32. Including the Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation
Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (codified in part at 38 U.S.C. §
1154 (2000)); Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-321, 102 Stat. 485 [OR] Pub. L. No. 100-322, 102 Stat. 534 (1988) (codified at 38
C.F.R. § 3.309(d) (2011) and as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (2006)); and Radiation
Exposure Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (2006) (amended 2000).
33. 38 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (2006).
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This article argues that the current application of VDRECSA
and REVCA creates challenges for the Atomic Veteran, often
precluding the award of service connection. This is due, in part,
to the way the VA evaluates the claim, arguably imposing a
higher standard of review on these claims than was intended by
Congress. Rather than reflecting a “likely association” between
the disease and the radiation exposure, the way in which the VA
evaluates these factors reflect a heightened “cause and effect”
standard of review. Thus, the procedure by which radiation
cases are reviewed precludes the application of the benefit-ofthe-doubt standard,34 violating expressed congressional
command. Therefore, current regulations governing claims
adjudication should be interpreted or amended to conform to
the governing statutes and congressional intent. This would
ease the burden on Atomic Veterans, subjecting their servicerelated compensation claims to the same standard of review that
other similarly situated veterans (i.e. Vietnam Veterans)
currently receive under the VDRECSA legislation.
In summary, this article argues that Atomic Veterans face
an unnecessary number of challenges in establishing serviceconnected disability claims for their radiologic diseases; and
thus, the VA should adopt a new standard under which these
claims are evaluated. In Sections III and IV this article will
outline the reasons why scientists and veterans have difficulty
linking radiological diseases to radiation exposure incurred
during military service. Next, this article will outline and
evaluate the various laws that regulate veteran access to
benefits. In Section VI the article presents a case study that is
indicative of the difficulties inherent in a veteran appeal for
benefits. Finally, this article suggests the VA use a standard
similar to dioxin claims when evaluating veteran claims for
benefits.
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34. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2012).

C M
Y K

33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 12 Side A

07/02/2013 13:56:24

PUBLISHED.KABATCHNICK.MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

RADIOACTIVE VETERANS

6/17/2013 5:29 PM

159

III. MILITARY MISSIONS: RADIATION, SECRECY &
MISINFORMATION
A. RADIATION AND THE LACK OF PROTECTION
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35. WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1873 (3d ed. 2002).
36. See generally Henning Willers & H.-P. Beck-Bornholdt, Origins of
Radiotherapy and Radiobiology, 38 RADIOTHERAPY & ONCOLOGY 171 (1996) (outlining
the origins and growth of radiobiology).
37. See generally U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY, supra note 6. See also Harold
L. Brode, Review of Nuclear Weapons Effects, 18 ANN. REV. NUCLEAR SCI. 153, 155
(1968).
38. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 9, at viii.
39. REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 8, 21.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., JONATHAN M. WEISGALL, OPERATION CROSSROADS: THE ATOMIC
TESTS AT BIKINI ATOLL 230 (1994). See BACK FROM DUTY: OZAUKEE COUNTY’S
VETERANS SHARE THEIR STORIES 14 (Laurie Arendt ed., 2002).
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Radiobiology is the study of the effects of ionizing radiation
upon living organisms.35 The field originated and developed,
along with nuclear science, during the twentieth century.36
Nuclear bombs release radiation in the form of x-rays, gamma
rays, neutron radiation, beta particles, and alpha particles
(depending upon the bombs initial composition and the route of
detonation).37 Through military missions that involved the
detonation of nuclear bombs, much was learned about how to
better control the nuclear reactions and the types of radiation
emitted from the blasts.38 Unfortunately, during these military
missions little was known about the complexity of radiation
exposure. However, the potential for gamma ray radiation was
known; and, gamma radiation detectors, called “dosimeter
badges,” were used to measure gamma radiation exposure.39
Worn by soldiers at select locations, the badges were analyzed
and used to determine radiation fields and to approximate
gamma radiation doses.40
During these missions, precautions to protect soldiers from
radiation exposure were either absent or inadequate.41 The
military adopted the “duck and cover” strategy for protecting
soldiers, and encouraged veterans to utilize bunkers to avoid
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42. DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, OPERATION UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE FACT
SHEET 2, 8 (2008).
43. DEF. NUCLEAR AGENCY, supra note 5, 171–72.
44. Radiation Protection Basics, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
rpdweb00/understand/protection_basics.html (last updated July 6, 2012).
45. Radiation Exposure and Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC’Y,
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/othercarcinogens/medicaltreatments/ra
diation-exposure-and-cancer (last revised Mar. 29, 2010).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 5, 21.
51. Id. at 60–63.
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flash burns.42 Other protective mechanisms included smoke
curtains, shoe covers, and showering.43 Although these methods
may have provided primitive cover from some types of
radiation, these methods have proven to be largely ineffective
because the particles and radiation rays emitted from nuclear
reactions have unique properties.44 Alpha particles are easily
absorbed by a thin piece of paper or the dead cells of the skin
and pose little danger to a person fully covered.45 Beta particles
can be absorbed by clothing, but particles maintain the potential
to penetrate and burn the skin.46 However, when alpha or beta
particles are inhaled or ingested the particles can damage
internal organs.47 Gamma rays, x-rays, and neutrons penetrate
the skin and are absorbed by the internal organs.48 If alpha
particles, beta particles, neutrons, gamma rays, or x-rays reach
living cells, the living cells absorb the radiation.49 The radiation
then acts in a variety of ways to interfere with normal cellular
processes, directly killing the cell or damaging the cells’ DNA,
which can eventually develop into cancer.
In the absence of adequate protection, soldiers involved in
these missions were exposed to ionizing radiation in a variety of
ways. Veterans exposed to the initial blast were likely irradiated
with x-rays, neutron and gamma rays, beta particles, and alpha
particles.50 This type of exposure has been linked to solid
tumors and leukemia.51 Veterans who inhaled radioactive dust
likely had radioactive material deposited in their nose, lungs,
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and bones.52 This material remains in the veterans’ tissues,
emitting radioactive material for years, eventually causing nasal,
lung, or bone cancer, and bone disease.53 The Nevada and
Marshall Island testing sites hosted several training missions
where radioactivity accumulated in the sand, soil, and water; so,
soldiers were exposed to large amounts of radioactivity from
prior and current shots.54 During these missions the soldiers
lived in radioactive environments, drank and bathed in
radioactive water,55 and ingested radioactive food.56 These
veterans are ripe for bladder cancers in addition to the
commonly associated radiation cancers.57 Most veterans were
exposed to radiation through several of these activities and,
thus, are susceptible to a variety of diseases.
B. THE ROLE OF MILITARY SECRECY
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52. Id. at 32, 34–35.
53. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR IONIZING RADIATION 9, 42, 57 (1999),
available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ToxProfiles/tp149.pdf.
54. See Frank Munger, Atomic Vet Recalls 1946 Bomb Tests – and Dirty Aftermath,
KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 2008, http://www.knoxnews.com/
news/2008/sep/21/atomic-vet-recalls/.
55. Id.
56. REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 21, 34.
57. See id. at 22. See also, e.g., TERRY GREENE ET AL., CANCER AND WORKERS
EXPOSED TO IONIZING RADIATION: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH LITERATURE 13–16 (2003).
58. Exec. Order No. 8,381, 5 Fed. Reg. 1,147 (Mar. 22, 1940).
59. Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–99 (2006).
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Military secrecy is a unique hurdle for the Atomic Veteran.
On one hand, secrecy was, and is, deemed requisite to
patriotism. On the other hand, the same secrecy compromised
the veteran’s medical care, access to records, and prevented
scientists from performing early epidemiological studies. In
1940, President Franklin Roosevelt issued an Executive Order,
which protected information relating to military and naval
installations.58 Citing the Espionage Act of 1917, Roosevelt set
the federal government’s classification standards for secrecy,
and broadly applied secrecy to all government officials.59 After
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World War II, Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act60 and
the Invention Secrecy Act,61 noting the national security
implication of some scientific and technological advances.62 It is
this legislation that provides the basic framework for protecting
secrecy related to nuclear weapons testing. Along with the
Espionage Act of 1917, this legislation subjects Atomic Veterans
to penalties for disclosing information related to their
mission(s).63
Since much of the information related to the nuclear testing
missions was classified, veterans could not disclose their
missions. Therefore, Atomic Veterans could not legally disclose
their potential radiation exposure during military service.
Physicians, largely ignorant of the scope of military nuclear
missions, would not know to ask the veteran about ionizing
radiation exposure and, therefore, would be less likely to
consider a radiological disease as a diagnosis. Additionally,
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60. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2000).
61. Invention Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1994).
62. Id. (authorizing the Commissioner of Patents to keep secret those patents
on inventions in which the government has an ownership interest and the
widespread knowledge of which would harm national security). See generally
JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33502, PROTECTION OF NATIONAL
SECURITY INFORMATION (2006), and GENEVIEVE J. KNEZO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL 33303, “SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED” INFORMATION & OTHER CONTROLS:
POLICY & OPTIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL INFORMATION (2006), for a more
detailed discussion of these and other regulatory regimes for the protection of
sensitive government information.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (2006)
(Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or
otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or
uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United
States any classified information – (1) concerning the nature, preparation,
or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or
any foreign government; or (2) concerning the design, construction, use,
maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or
prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign
government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or
(3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United
States or any foreign government; or (4) obtained by the processes of
communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign
government, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes –
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both.).
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64. See, e.g., Stafford L. Warren, Conclusions: Tests Proved Irresistible Spread of
Radioactivity, LIFE, Aug. 1947, at 86, 88.
65. Survey Pressed on Illness of Atomic Veterans, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1983,
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/06/22/us/survey-pressed-on-illness-of-atomicveterans.html.
66. The Research and Development Board, Committee on Medical Sciences
and Committee on Atomic Energy, Directive Joint Panel on Medical Aspects of
Atomic Warfare, (Washington 25, D.C 23 Feb. 1949), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/radiation/dir/mstreet/commeet/meet4/brief4.gfr/tab
_o/br4o2a.txt.
67. THE RESEARCH & DEV. BD., DIRECTIVE: JOINT PANEL ON MEDICAL ASPECTS
OF ATOMIC WARFARE 5 (1949), available at
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because the government had informed the veterans that their
radiation exposure was not harmful, the veteran would also
have no reason to suspect the manifestation of a radiological
disease either immediately or decades later.64 Moreover, many
veterans refused to believe illnesses and birth defects might have
been caused by their service.65 As a result, many Atomic
Veterans’ health and medical treatments were likely
compromised by the secrecy order.
The secrecy of these nuclear missions also adversely
affected the identification of radiation diseases because the
secrecy order slowed and distorted the flow of information. The
independent scientific community, largely unaware of these
nuclear missions, was not able to study the environmental and
health effects of the radiation exposure, and scientists and
medical professionals could not collect data from government
officials or veterans to link radiation exposure to specific
diseases. A small body of governmental medical doctors,
working under the Atomic Energy Commission, was the only
group of scientists who had access to the radiological data.66
Unfortunately, these doctors were not collecting Atomic
Veterans’ medical records to assess the long term medical risks
associated with radiation exposure, but rather they were
conducting “research and development in the medical aspects of
atomic warfare with specific emphasis on human tolerance to
and protection against radioactivity, decontamination of
exposed
individuals,
and
treatment
of
radiation
67
Without the scientific evidence linking
casualties . . . .”
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radiation exposure to a particular disease, the VA could not
award service-connected medical benefits or compensate the
veteran for his/her suffering.68
In the early 1980s scientists began to publish studies linking
veterans’ radiation exposure with mortality and cancer,69 which
prompted congressional inquiries of the Nuclear Weapons
Testing Program.70 Subsequently, the U.S. Government began to
Energy
declassify documents relating to the program.71
Secretary, Hazel O’Leary, characterized the U.S. Weapons
Testing Program, stating, “[w]e were shrouded and clouded in
an atmosphere of secrecy. . . . And I would take it a step further:
I would call it repression.”72 These disclosures provided
Congress the opportunity to hold further inquiries73 and
strengthen legislation for compensating Atomic Veterans.74
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http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/radiation/dir/mstreet/commeet/meet4/brief4.gfr/tab
_o/br4o2a.txt (creating the Joint Panel on Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare).
68. Under the direct service-connection regulation, 38 C.F.R. Section 3.303(d),
the Veteran is required to produce competent medical evidence sufficient to
establish a well–grounded claim establishing a causal link to their exposure to
radiation in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2011); 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) (2006). Thus, the
veteran would have to submit medical evidence of a nexus between an in-service
injury or disease and a current disability.
69. See, e.g., Caldwell et al., Leukemia, supra note 18, at 1575–78; Glyn G.
Caldwell et al., Mortality & Cancer Frequency Among Military Nuclear Test (Smoky)
Participants, 1957 Through 1979, 250 JAMA 620, 624 (1983) [hereinafter Caldwell et
al., Smoky].
70. See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, 96TH
CONG., THE FORGOTTEN GUINEA PIGS (Comm. Print 1980).
71. See generally THOMAS B. COCHRAN ET AL., NUCLEAR WEAPONS DATABOOK,
VOLUME 1: U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES AND CAPABILITIES (1984). The purpose of the
Nuclear Weapons Databook series is to shed light on the secrecy involving
information about nuclear weapons. See also John H. Cushman, Jr., 204 Secret
Nuclear Tests by U.S. are Made Public., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993,
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/08/us/204-secret-nuclear-tests-by-us-are-madepublic.html.
72. John H. Cushman, Jr., 204 Secret Nuclear Tests by U.S. are Made Public., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/08/us/204-secret-nucleartests-by-us-are-made-public.html.
73. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 103-97 (1994).
74. See, e.g., Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation
Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (codified in part at 38 U.S.C. §
1154 (2000)); Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-321, 102 Stat. 485 [OR] Pub. L. No. 100-322, 102 Stat. 534 (1988) (codified at 38
C.F.R. § 3.309(d) (2011) and as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (2006)); and Radiation
Exposure Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (2006) (amended 2000).

33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 15 Side A

07/02/2013 13:56:24

PUBLISHED.KABATCHNICK.MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

6/17/2013 5:29 PM

RADIOACTIVE VETERANS

165

C. MISINFORMATION BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Although the acute effects of radiation exposure were
revealed through the studies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
scientists have always been concerned with the long-term or
chronic effects of ionizing radiation. However, these concerns
were not directly communicated to veterans or the public. 75 In
fact, U.S. Government agencies assured the public that radiation
was harmless76 and set forth a campaign to “cure[] [service
members] of the ‘mystical’ fear of radiation,”77 so “America’s
atomic war-fighting capability would [not] be crippled.”78 To
assure service members that radiation exposure was harmless,
the Army provided brochures to service members to allay their
fears.79
Publicly, the government assured soldiers that radiation
was harmless, but an important part of the U.S. Nuclear Testing
program was to understand the effects of radiation in the theater
of war. Thus, various agencies tasked with this job used
veterans as test subjects and discovered that exposure was quite
harmful. For example, the Joint Panel on Medical Aspects of
Atomic Warfare’s 1949 Directive, listed below, clearly
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C M
Y K

33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 15 Side A

75. See Warren, supra note 64, at 88 (exhibiting that concerns were not
communicated). See also HENSHAW, supra note 24, at 2–3 (exhibiting that even in
1947, due to previous irradiation experiences, the program had “good reason to
believe that reproductive disturbances, malignancies of one form or another,
shortened life span, altered genetic pattern, etc., will in time appear in greater or
lesser degrees.”).
76. See DEP’T OF CIVIL DEF., SURVIVAL UNDER ATOMIC ATTACK (1951), available
at http://ia700606.us.archive.org/4/items/survivalunderato00bost/
survivalunderato00bost.pdf and Nick Thorpe, Radioactive Fallout to Iron County, UT,
WASH. NUCLEAR MUSEUM & EDUC. CTR., http://toxipedia.org/display/wanmec/
Radioactive+Fallout+to+Iron+County,+UT (last updated Nov. 2, 2010), for examples
of information released to the public.
77. NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR THE PROPULSION OF AIRCRAFT MEDICAL ADVISORY
PANEL, ACHRE No. DOD-121494-A-2, PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF CREW
SELECTION RELATIVE TO THE SPECIAL HAZARDS OF IRRADIATION EXPOSURE (July 22,
1949).
78. ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, FINAL REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, at Chapter 10
(1995), available at http://www.hss.doe.gov/healthsafety/ohre/roadmap/achre/
index.html [hereinafter ACHRE].
79. Id.
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demonstrates a willingness to use veterans as experimental
subjects:
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BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIATION
1. Military Goals
1.1 Immediate goals
The immediate goals are to obtain new and meaningful
information on the biological effects of ionizing
radiation concerning:
1.1.1 Maximum single and repeated doses of
radiation which may be tolerated by man with
reasonable safety.
1.1.2 Hazardous doses which may cause incapacity
for performance of diverse military missions with or
without permanent damage or death. Determine
critical dose to incapacitate within a matter of hours.
1.1.3 Casualty-producing doses which should lead to
evacuation from contaminated areas whenever
possible.
1.1.4.Toxicology of radioactive materials.
1.1.5 Effects on man of moderate doses.
1.1.6 The effects of radiation as modified by various
concurrent factors such as burns, trauma, and
infections, on environments.
1.1.7 Effects of radiation on the central nervous
system and its function in man and mammals.
1.2 Future Goals
The future goal is to understand the biologic
mechanisms underlying radiation damage, so the
potential radiation injury may be prevented, minimized
or treated.
2. Deficiencies of Present Equipments and Systems in
Meeting Requirements
2.1 Lack of accurate information concerning effects of
various dose levels of external radiation on man.
2.2
Lack of accurate information concerning
toxicology of absorbed radioactive materials.
2.3 There is lack of existing knowledge concerning
the combined effects of radiation, thermal, and
traumatic injury.
3. Present Research and Development Program in
Support of Requirements
3.1 The attainment of immediate goals is technically
feasible provided that effects of moderate dose levels of
external radiation may be observed on human patients
and volunteers.
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In 1994, by Executive Order, President Clinton created the
Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments to
investigate and report on the use of human beings as subjects of
federally funded research using ionizing radiation.81 This report
elucidated, in great detail, the lack of information about ionizing
radiation and the misinformation communicated to service
members and the public about the health effects of radiation
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80. See generally THE RESEARCH & DEV. BD., supra note 67 (outlining its directive
that includes using veterans as test subjects).
81. ACHRE, supra note 78, at Executive Summary.
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3.2 The obtaining and disinformation of necessary
information is a military necessity.
3.3 Most of the immediate goals can be achieved in
five years provided there is adequate financial and
scientific stimulus.
3.4 Alternative programs - none.
3.5 Some duplication is inevitable and desirable in
the present state of progress. The most serious gap is
failure to secure adequate quantitative data on the
efforts of ionizing radiation on man.
3.6 The program shows no evidence of suffering
from lack of planning personnel, facilities or money.
4. Conclusions and Recommendations
4.1 Researches in biological effects of radiation
should be continued.
4.1.1 Continue the study of the deterioration of motor
and sensory functions attending sublethal and lethal
irradiation in mammals.
4.1.2 Decrease the emphasis on primates (monkeys).
4.1.3 Increase the emphasis on the mutual influence of
radiation injury combined with thermal and with
traumatic injury.
4.2 It is still necessary to initiate measurements of the
effects of moderate doses of radiation in man.
4.3 Advantage should be taken of any opportunities
for the study of the biological effects of radiation
particularly in man.
4.4 Some duplication of effort in all phases of the
program is justifiable and necessary for rapid progress.
This refers both to duplication (a) within the Services,
and (b) between the Services and the world of science.80
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exposure.82 It stated:
Data obtained on some military personnel who were
exposed to radioactive fallout were collected after these
men were unintentionally exposed. However, some
atomic veterans believe they were used as guinea pigs
to determine the effects of radiation from various
distances, including those at ground zero, on human
subjects. Their suspicions are supported by a 1951
document from the Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects
of Atomic Warfare, Research and Development Board,
Department of Defense, which identified general
criteria for bomb test-related “experiments” and
identified 29 “specific problems” as “legitimate basis
for biomedical participation.” 83
The declassification of the Operation “Castle” Report84 and
Operation “Upshot-Knothole” Reports85 (among other reports
prepared during the testing missions) showed that the
Commission meticulously recorded the troop movements, the
exposure of service members to ionizing radiation, and potential
concerns related to ionizing radiation exposure.86
IV. LINKING RADIOLOGICAL DISEASE TO MILITARY SERVICE
A. MANIFESTATION OF THE RADIOLOGICAL DISEASE, YEARS
LATER
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82. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON VETERAN’S AFFAIRS, 103D CONG., IS MILITARY
RESEARCH HAZARDOUS TO VETERAN’S HEALTH? LESSONS SPANNING HALF A
CENTURY 7 (Comm. Print 1994).
83. Id. at 7 (citation omitted).
84. E. P. CRONKITE ET AL., NAVAL MED. RESEARCH INST. & U.S. NAVAL
RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LAB., OPERATION CASTLE – FINAL REPORT PROJECT 4.1:
STUDY OF RESPONSE OF HUMAN BEINGS ACCIDENTALLY EXPOSED TO SIGNIFICANT
FALLOUT RADIATION (1954), available at
https://www.osti.gov/opennet/servlets/purl/16061854-leUIeE/16061854.pdf.
85. See generally DEF. NUCLEAR AGENCY, supra note 5 (declassifying Operation
Upshot-Knothole).
86. See generally id.; see generally CRONKITE ET AL., supra note 84; see also THAUL
ET AL., supra note 18, at 129-47.
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Epidemiological studies conducted over the latter half of the
twentieth century revealed that the deleterious effects of nuclear
radiation can take decades to manifest, resulting in a variety of
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diseases.87 Leukemia was quickly linked to radiation exposure
in the 1940s and 1950s.88 However, it was not until the early
1980s that ionizing radiation was firmly linked to solid tumors
and cancer,89 initiating a host of new scientific studies.90 Now,
recent publications link ionizing radiation exposure to many
diseases, including cardiovascular, respiratory, and digestive
diseases, avascular necrosis, Alzheimer’s disease, and
myelodysplastic syndromes.91 As time progresses and statistical
methods become more sophisticated, epidemiologists will likely
continue to find new links between radiological exposure and
disease.
The long-term effects of ionizing radiation are difficult to
study in animals, as the animal model selected must be able to
live long enough for the disease to manifest. This precludes
studies in small lab animals like rats or rabbits, which have short
life spans. The studies must also be done in a large number of
animals, due to the low incidence of disease and the variety of
tissues affected. There have been some studies using beagle
dogs92 and monkeys93 to assess the long-term effects of
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87. See generally UNIV. OF WASH. ENVTL. HEALTH & SAFETY, supra note 26, at
Bio-9. See generally Evan B. Douple et al., Long-Term Radiation-Related Health Effects
in a Unique Human Population: Lessons Learned from the Atomic Bomb Survivors of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 5 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS S122 (Supp.
2011), for a review of several recently published studies.
88. Paul S. Henshaw & James W. Hawkins, Incidence of Leukemia in Physicians, 4
J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 339 (1944).
89. See Caldwell et al., Smoky, supra note 69, at 621–23.
90. See DEF. NUCLEAR AGENCY, supra note 5, at 16. See generally COMM. ON THE
BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HEALTH
EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO LOW LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION: BEIR V 1-3 (1996)
(reviewing the significant development in radiation exposure knowledge). See, e.g.,
COMM. ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION, NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, HEALTH EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO LOW LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION:
BEIR VII vii (2006) [hereinafter BEIR VII] (summarizing findings of the health effects
of low dose x-ray and gamma ray studies initiated in the 1980s and 1990s).
91. See generally M. P. Little, Cancer and Non-Cancer Effects in Japanese Atomic
Bomb Survivors, 29 J. RADIOL. PROT. A43, A44 (2009); Nasrin Begum et al., Does
Ionizing Radiation Influence Alzheimer’s Disease Risk?, 53 J. RADIOL. RES., 815, 815, 818
(2012); Masako Iwanaga et al., Risk of Myelodysplastic Syndromes in People Exposed to
Ionizing Radiation: A Retrospective Cohort Study of Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Survivors, 29
J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 428, 428, 431–34 (2011).
92. See, e.g., J. H. Diel et al., Influence of Dose Rate on Survival Time for 239PuO2Induced Radiation Pneumonitis or Pulmonary Fibrosis in Dogs, 129 RADIATION RES. 53
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plutonium inhalation. In these studies, animal health has been
evaluated over a few years, but the studies have been small,
utilizing only a handful of animals in each study. Additionally,
the types of radiation (and how the radiation gets to the tissue)
complicate these studies. For example, alpha radiation does not
penetrate tissue well, unlike gamma radiation, which can
traverse through inches of tissue and affect tissue deep in the
body, making for a difficult assessment of disease progression.94
Also, organs have unique sensitivities to radiation, and some
tissues (e.g., lung, liver, kidney, and bone) concentrate
radioactive particles. This results in these organs receiving a
larger dose of radioactivity, delivered over the course of a
lifetime.95
Identifying radiological diseases in the human population is
challenging for the scientific community, as the research requires
longitudinal epidemiological studies. Scientists retrospectively
analyze medical and death records, then they correlate these
findings with the estimated radiation dose.96 However, this data
is often erroneous or incomplete. If death and medical records
are found they are subject to misdiagnosis and limited by the
medical knowledge at the time they were recorded.97 Radiation
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(1992).
93. See NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
REPORT ON CARCINOGENS 238 (12th ed. 2011), available at
http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/roc/twelfth/profiles/IonizingRadiation.pdf(listing
various experimental animals).
94. EMP. EDUC. SYS., supra note 14, at 10.
95. REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 101–07.
96. See generally Jonathan M. Samet, Epidemiologic Studies of Ionizing Radiation
and Cancer: Past Successes and Future Challenges, 105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 883
(Supp. 4 1997), for a review of the epidemiological methods used. See also generally
Steve Wing, Limits of Epidemiology, 1 MED. & GLOBAL SURVIVAL 74 (1994) (describing
epidemiology as a discipline).
97. See, e.g., COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY.,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 241–
68 (2009). See also PowerPoint: John D. Boice, Jr., Slide Presentation, Review of Atomic
Veterans Epidemiology Study at the VETERANS’ ADVISORY BOARD ON DOSE
RECONSTRUCTION MEETING (Mar. 23-24, 2012), slide 10, available at
http://www.vbdr.org/meetings/2012/Presentations/1-Boice_VBDR_Mar12.pdf
(reporting that of 115,328 atomic veterans surveyed, the VA has epidemiological
data on only 80,186 (or 69%), the remainder are unknown causes of death).
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dose estimates are often based on assumptions, with little hard
data supporting the dose estimate.98 These epidemiological
studies are also subject to confounding variables like lifestyle
(e.g., cigarette smoking or radiation exposure from medical xrays), age at exposure, and gender, all of which complicate the
analysis of the results.99 For many years it was thought that a
low dose of radiation did not increase a person’s risk for
radiological disease, but a recent government study has changed
this misconception.100 It is now accepted that there is a strong
linear dose-response relationship, and even exposure to low
levels of radiation is dangerous.101 Additionally, the potential
for intergenerational genetic transmission of radiological
diseases has been thought to be low, but has been demonstrated
in animals.102 Thus, the full scope of the effects of radiation
exposure has yet to be realized by the Atomic Veteran
population and their families and descendants.
B. RETROSPECTIVELY ESTIMATING RADIATION DOSE

98. REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 3, 30. See also COMM. ON EVALUATION
OF THE PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR VETERANS,
IMPROVING THE PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR VETERANS
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90–91, app. I-51–52 (Jonathan M. Samet & Catherine C. Bodurow eds., 2008),
available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11908.html [hereinafter EVALUATION OF
PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY].
99. See generally Wing, supra note 96 (discussing problems with and limitations
of epidemiological studies). See also NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, supra note 93, at
238. For example, the young are more susceptible than the old; females are more
susceptible than males; and risks differ by organ or tissue.
100. See BEIR VII, supra note 90, at 10 (finding health risks associated with
exposure to low doses of radiation).
101. Id. at 10, 14–15.
102. See generally UNIV. OF WASH. ENVTL. HEALTH & SAFETY, supra note 26, at
Bio-21–23.
103. CRONKITE ET AL., supra note 84, at 15, 24.
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During the nuclear weapons testing, it was known that a
variety of radiation was released into the atmosphere and that
participants were exposed to neutron, gamma, x-ray radiation,
alpha, and beta particles.103 However, little hard data was
collected during the nuclear tests to assess radiation exposure.
Only during the initial bomb blast was a portion of this
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104. REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 70.
105. Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-542, § 2, 98 Stat. 2725, 2726 (1984)
(These film badges often provide an incomplete measure of radiation
exposure, since they were not capable of recording inhaled, ingested, or
neutron doses (although the Defense Nuclear Agency currently has the
capability to reconstruct individual estimates of such doses), were not
issued to most of the participants in nuclear tests, often provided
questionable readings because they were shielded during the detonation,
and were worn for only limited periods during and after each nuclear
detonation.).
106. REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 1.
107. See id. at 69–123.
108. Id. at 119–21. Doses are reported in unit "rem." Id. at vii.
109. Id. at 70.
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radiation, the gamma radiation, recorded by the dosimeter
badges. A small number of these badges were distributed
around the battlefield to a few participants to measure where the
gamma radiation was distributed and how it affected troop
movements.104 However, most participants were not issued
badges, and these badges often provided incomplete data.105
The Department of Defense (DOD) created the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to assess veterans’ radiation
exposure.106 The DTRA’s method for reconstructing radiation
dose uses existing raw data and assumptions that are input into
mathematical formulas. Raw data used includes, for example,
dosimeter data (gamma radiation detectors), bomb detonation
data, records of troop movements, and records of environmental
data including weather reports.107 The DTRA then reports to the
service member his or her external radiation dose, internal
radiation dose, and upper bound estimations.108 The methods
used to estimate radiation dose have been revised many times
since the first dose estimates were reported in 1978; and, there is
no systematic way to review earlier dose estimates or apply
changes retroactively.109
The ability to reconstruct the radiation dose is difficult
because the lack of raw data, quite naturally, attracts the need
for many assumptions. Assumptions include the radiation
profile emitted from the bomb, the veterans’ location relative to
the radiation, the duration of the exposure, and theories about
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110. Id. at 34, 124–230, 367.
111. Id. at 69–123.
112. Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-542, § 2, 98 Stat. 2725, 2726 (1984).
113. REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 83–84, 86–101.
114. Id. at 66–68, 73–74.
115. Id. at 35, 82, 87–88.
116. Id. at 1, 6–7.
117. Id. at 124–231.
118. Id. at 124–264. The reader is referred to the finding of the NAS committee
regarding the numerous limitations related to the dose reconstruction estimate
methodology used by the DTRA.
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how the radioactive particles may distribute in, or on, the
human body.110 Other assumptions used include, for example,
posture and position of the service member during exposure,
breathing rate, and tissue susceptibility to each radiation type.111
It is also assumed that the service members who wore dosimeter
badges wore them correctly, and the badge was not shielded
from radiation by clothing, dog tags, or other devices that would
Service members
interfere with radiation detection.112
downwind of the explosion were assumed to have likely
received higher doses of inhaled radiation than service members
who were upwind.113 Service members who were down in
bunkers or trenches were assumed to have been protected from
neutron and gamma radiation compared to those who stood up
and watched the shot.114 Lastly, how the solider was physically
positioned (sitting, standing, running) and his breathing pattern
is included in the radiation dose estimate.115
These assumptions make the dose calculation highly
speculative and, thus, material when evaluating a reconstructed
dose – for it is these dose reconstruction estimates that the VA
considers when evaluating whether a veteran should receive
service-connected compensation for their non-presumptive
diseases.116 In 2000, Congress requested a review of the DTRA’s
dose reconstruction program. In its 2003 report, the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) was highly critical of the DTRA’s
methodology and assumptions.117 The NAS identified several
instances where the DTRA used methods that under-estimated
veterans’ radiation dose.118 Thus, the radiation dose estimates
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that the VA relies upon to award benefits are known to be
inadequate. However, the VA continues to rely upon these
calculations in evaluating service-connection for radiogenic
diseases not specifically outlined in the statutes.
C. COLLECTING AND INTERPRETING THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL
DATA
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119. For a comprehensive list of ionizing radiation epidemiological papers
considered by the Institute of Medicine, see EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE
DISABILITY, supra note 98, at app. I-61–63.
120. Caldwell et al., Leukemia, supra note 18, at 1578; Caldwell et al., Smoky, supra
note 69, at 624; COMM. ON THE CROSSROADS NUCLEAR TEST, INST. OF MED.,
MORTALITY OF VETERAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE CROSSROADS NUCLEAR TEST 8 (1996);
THAUL ET AL., supra note 18, at 77–78. For a general summary of all studies see
EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at app. I-59–61.
121. See BEIR VII, supra note 90, at 14–15; NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, supra
note 93, at 238. See also generally Wing, supra note 96 (describing possible
confounding factors in determining whether cancer was caused by radiation alone).
122. EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at app. I-52.
123. Id. at app. I-59.
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Based on the existing epidemiological data, there is no
doubt that radiation exposure causes cancer.119 The few studies
of Crossroads Atomic Veterans suggest some correlation
between radiation exposure and leukemia.120 However, the
probability that an individual’s cancer was a result of radiation
exposure depends on many factors, including the type of cancer,
the tissue affected, age at exposure, and other factors of the
individual.121 The NAS carefully points out that “[g]iven these
uncertainties of the data on veterans, a negative or inconsistent
finding cannot be taken as definitive evidence against a causal
connection, in the face of the wealth of positive evidence from
other epidemiological studies.”122 The Crossroad studies are
based on a small number of veterans, and it is difficult to
demonstrate the small number of excess cancers in small
populations.123
Linking radiological diseases to radiation exposure during
military service is additionally challenging, due to the
confounding variables associated with a lack of reliable
radiation dose estimates and the nature of the service-connected
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radiation exposure.124 This is because each of the nuclear bomb
missions had different detonation routes and strengths, resulting
in distinct decay schemes and radiation emission profiles.125 In
other words, detonation of the Shot “Badger” exposed service
members to a different radiation profile and strength than the
detonation of the Shot Baker. Veterans were exposed to a
variety of radiation (alpha and beta particles, gamma, neutron
and x-ray), doses, and exposure routes. These factors complicate
the analysis of epidemiological studies of service members.
Additionally, not all cancers in a radiation-exposed individual
are a result of their military service.
Of the 1,646 claims related to radiation exposure processed
by the VA in the 1970s and early 1980s, only 30 were granted;126
945 (or 57%) of the denied claims were for solid tumors or
cancers.127 The claims were denied based on the lack of
epidemiological data linking radiation exposure with specific
diseases. Because of the numerous uncertainties associated with
estimating individual exposure and calculating the probability
that their cancer or chronic disease is service-related, Congress
recognized the need for legislation to aid veteran
compensation.128
V. RECEIVING COMPENSATION

Veterans can show entitlement to benefits on a direct basis if
the evidence establishes that the disease was incurred in
service.129 Direct service-connection can be established by
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124. REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 8, 227, 258. See also EVALUATION OF
PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at app. I-52.
125. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Serv., Nuclear Detonation: Weapons,
Improvised Nuclear Devices, RADIATION EMERGENCY MED. MGMT.,
http://www.remm.nlm.gov/nuclearexplosion.htm (last updated Dec. 21, 2012).
126. 130 CONG. REC. 13,147–49 (1984) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
127. Id.
128. 130 CONG. REC. 29,551 (1984) (statement of Rep. Montgomery).
129. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2011).
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130. Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
131. Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (codified in part at 38 U.S.C. § 1154 (2000)).
132. Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100321, 102 Stat. 485 [OR] Pub. L. No. 100-322, 102 Stat. 534 (1988) (codified at 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.309(d) (2011) and as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (2006)).
133. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (2006)
(amended 2000).
134. See Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/civil/common/reca.html (last updated Jan. 14, 2013).
135. Id.
136. Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (codified in part at 38 U.S.C. § 1154 (2000)).
This statute does not contain presumptions but directs the VA to adopt regulations
that would assist veterans who have been exposed to radiation.
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“show[ing] that the disease or malady was incurred during or
aggravated by service,” a task which “includes the difficult
burden of tracing causation to a condition or event during
service.”130 However, in the absence of solid epidemiological
data, this was a preclusive hurdle for most Atomic Veteran
claims. In response, Congress passed three additional statutes
that addressed compensation for veterans who experienced
radiation exposure during service and have manifest
“radiological diseases.” These laws include: VDRECSA,131
REVCA,132 and RECA.133
VDRECSA and REVCA claims are reviewed by the VA. In
contrast, RECA claims are reviewed by the DOJ and award a
lump sum payment to veterans “who contracted certain cancers
and other serious diseases following their exposure to radiation
released during the atmospheric nuclear weapons tests.”134 Also,
the DOJ does not require claimants to establish causation.135 It is
also important to note that compensation from a RECA DOJ
claim can adversely affect the potential compensation from
VDRECSA and REVCA Veterans Administration claims, so
careful planning is required.
Originally, veterans who were exposed to ionizing radiation
had to file for compensation under the strict terms of
VDRECSA awards compensation only if a
VDRECSA.136
veteran’s disease is “likely” or “as likely as not” the result of
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exposure to radiation while in service.137 This law requires that a
dose reconstruction and evaluation be conducted on behalf of
the veteran.
Few veterans have been able to receive
compensation under these criteria, as it is difficult to establish
service-connection between the disease, the reconstructed
radiation dose, and the existing epidemiological data.138
In 1988, Congress passed the REVCA, which established a
presumption of service-connection for thirteen specific
cancers.139 Under the presumptive service-connection scenario,
the veteran has to establish service during one of the specified
atomic missions and have one of the radiological diseases listed
in the statute.140 A dose reconstruction is not required or
considered for a presumptive service disease. Instead, the
statute creates a rebuttable presumption that the disease is
service-connected.141 This shifts the burden of proof to the VA,
as they must prove that the disease is not service-connected in
order to deny benefits. In 1992, two new cancers were added to
the presumptive list in the statute,142 and now the legislation
recognizes over 21 radiological cancers.143
The legislation has removed one encumbrance faced by
veterans seeking compensation, and few presumptive service-

07/02/2013 13:56:24
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137. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311 (2011).
138. See Matthew L. Wald, Veterans Nuclear Exposure Underestimated, Panel Says,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2003, at A20 (stating that of 4,000 claims submitted under the
non-presumptive statute, only 50 have been awarded).
139. Radiation-Exposed Veterans Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100321, § 2, 102 Stat. 485, 485 (1988).
140. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(d) (2011).
141. Id.
142. SARAH A. LISTER ET. AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33927, SELECTED
FEDERAL COMPENSATION PROGRAMS FOR PHYSICAL INJURY OR DEATH 26–27 (2008).
143. Id.
(The 21 cancers presumed to be service-connected for veterans who
participated in radiation-risk activities are: leukemia (all forms except
chronic lymphocytic leukemia); cancer of the thyroid, breast, pharynx,
esophagus, stomach, small intestine, pancreas, bile ducts, gall bladder,
salivary gland, urinary tract (renal pelvis, urethra, urinary bladder, and
urethra), brain, bone, lung, colon, and ovary; bronchiolo-alveolar
carcinoma; multiple myeloma; lymphomas (other than Hodgkin’s disease);
and primary liver cancer (except if cirrhosis or hepatitis B is indicated).).
See also 38 U.S.C. § 1112(c)(2) (2006).
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connection claims have been rebutted.144
Despite the
presumptive diseases that have been established, many veterans
still have difficulty establishing service-connection. These
veterans are unable to furnish the required evidence of their
exposure at a specified location and time, in part, because such
information may be classified as secret or their service records
are unavailable.145
Radiation-exposed veterans who do not suffer from one of
the statutorily-defined presumptive diseases must resort to the
non-presumptive requirements outlined by the VDRECSA or the
direct service-connection regulations under 38 C.F.R. Section
3.303(d). VDRECSA identifies a group of “radiogenic diseases”146
and criteria by which the Under Secretary for Benefits will
consider service-connection. By identifying particular diseases
as radiogenic, the regulation relieves the veteran of the need to
show that the in-service exposure to ionizing radiation was a
precipitating factor for the disease. When a veteran manifests
one of these “radiogenic diseases” within any applicable time
period, the VA is required to assess the size and nature of the
A
radiation dose that the veteran may have received.147
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144. EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at 54, 72.
145. Melinda F. Podgor, The Inability of World War II Atomic Veterans to Obtain
Disability Benefits: Time is Running Out on Our Chance to Fix the System, 13 ELDER L. J.
519, 533–34 (2005). For example, on July 12, 1973, a fire at the National Personnel
Records Center (NPRC) destroyed approximately 16-18 million Official Military
Personnel Files, including 80% of army veterans’ from WWII. The 1973 Fire,
National Personnel Records Center, NAT’L ARCHIVES, www.archives.gov/stlouis/military-personnel/fire-1973.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2013).
146. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(b)(2) (2011)
(For purposes of this section the term “radiogenic disease” means a
disease that may be induced by ionizing radiation and shall include the
following: (i) All forms of leukemia except chronic lymphatic
(lymphocytic) leukemia; (ii) Thyroid cancer; (iii) Breast cancer; (iv) Lung
cancer; (v) Bone cancer; (vi) Liver cancer; (vii) Skin cancer; (viii)
Esophageal cancer; (ix) Stomach cancer; (x) Colon cancer; (xi) Pancreatic
cancer; (xii) Kidney cancer; (xiii) Urinary bladder cancer; (xiv) Salivary
gland cancer; (xv) Multiple myeloma; (xvi) Posterior subcapsular cataracts;
(xvii) Non-malignant thyroid nodular disease; (xviii) Ovarian cancer; (xix)
Parathyroid adenoma; (xx) Tumors of the brain and central nervous
system; (xxi) Cancer of the rectum; (xxii) Lymphomas other than
Hodgkin's disease; (xxiii) Prostate cancer; and (xxiv) Any other cancer.).
147. See Davis v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 209, 213 (1997); Hardin v. West, 11 Vet.
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App. 74, 79 (1998); Ramey v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 40, 43 (1996).
148. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(c) (2011).
149. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(c)(2) (2011).
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radiation dose estimate from the DOD and other information is
then forwarded to the Under Secretary for Benefits for review.148
The Under Secretary for Benefits considers various factors and
may request an opinion from the Under Secretary for Health or
an outside consultant before ultimately determining whether “it
is at least as likely as not, or that there is no reasonable
possibility, the veteran’s disease resulted from radiation
exposure in service.”149 By requiring the involvement of the
Under Secretary for Benefits, the regulation attempts to
harmonize decision-making and give the veteran the benefit of
the most current scientific and medical studies of radiogenic
diseases.
Under 38 C.F.R. Section 3.311(e) the VA is required to
consider the upper bound calculation in assessing radiation
claims.
Under these regulations, there is a rebuttable
presumption of service-connection of other “radiogenic
diseases” if the VA Under Secretary for Benefits determines that
they are related to ionizing radiation exposure during service.
According to 38 C.F.R. Section 3.311(e), the factors to be
considered in determining whether a veteran’s disease resulted
from exposure to ionizing radiation in service include:
(1) The probable dose, in terms of dose type, rate and
duration as a factor in inducing the disease, taking into
account any known limitations in the dosimetry
devices employed in its measurement or the
methodologies employed in its estimation;
(2) The relative sensitivity of the involved tissue to
induction, by ionizing radiation, of the specific
pathology;
(3) The veteran’s gender and pertinent family history;
(4) The veteran’s age at time of exposure;
(5) The time-lapse between exposure and onset of the
disease; and
(6) The extent to which exposure to radiation, or other
carcinogens, outside of service may have contributed to
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development of the disease.150
If a claim is filed based on a disease that is not listed above,
the “VA shall nevertheless consider the claim under the
provisions of this section provided that the claimant has cited or
submitted competent scientific or medical evidence that the
claimed condition is a radiogenic disease.”151 For instance, one
disease that the VA has determined not to be a radiogenic
disease is polycythemia vera.152 The VA, however, is legally
required to consider a service-connection claim for polycythemia
vera based on radiation exposure as long as the claimant
submits competent medical or scientific evidence to support the
claim.153
B. THE VA INTERPRETS THE LAW TO EVALUATE CLAIMS
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Y K
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150. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(e) (2011).
151. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(b)(4) (2011). The statute goes on to explain that:
“Sound scientific evidence” means observations, findings, or conclusions
which are statistically and epidemiologically valid, are statistically
significant, are capable of replication, and withstand peer review, and
“sound medical evidence” means observations, findings or conclusions
which are consistent with current medical knowledge and are so
reasonable and logical as to serve as the basis of management of a medical
condition.
Id. at § 3.111(c)(3).
152. Id. at § 3.311(b)(3).
153. Id.
154. Flohr 2012, supra note 22, slide 4.
155. Flohr 2011, supra note 22, slide 4; and Flohr 2010, supra note 22, slide 6 (In
2011, 1,968 claims were granted and 3,683 denied; and, in 2010, 1,648 claims were
granted and 2,918 claims denied).
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For claims that fall within the statutory presumptive
legislation of REVCA, compensation should be fairly
straightforward. However, veterans have nonetheless struggled
to receive compensation. During fiscal year 2011-2012, the
Veterans Advisory Board on Dose Reconstruction reported that
of 7,715 REVCA and VDRECSA claims accepted for
adjudication, only 2,210 were granted.154 This is an increase in
compensated claims compared with the fiscal years 2009-2010
Unfortunately, the rate of success for
and 2010-2011.155
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VDRECSA non-presumptive disease claims cannot be estimated
because the VA does not keep these records.156 However,
VDRECSA non-service presumptive disease claims are thought
to be rarely awarded;157 and, in 2011 claim rejections included
many skin, prostate, and rectal cancers.158 It is important to note
that the veteran has the initial burden of proof, and that a person
who submits a claim for benefits under a law administered by
the Secretary shall have the burden of submitting evidence
sufficient to justify a belief, by a fair and impartial individual,
that the claim is well grounded.159 This is a fairly low standard;
and, most claims are considered to meet this standard and
determined to be well grounded. Nevertheless, claims are
denied when the Under Secretary of Benefits evaluates the
evidence. One need only to visit the Board of Veterans Appeals
website and search the terms “radiation exposure and related
decisions” to ascertain the volume of radiological disease claims
that the VA and BVA have denied.160
VDRECSA non-presumptive disease claim rejection is based
primarily on the way in which the VA considers the six factors
outlined in 38 C.F.R. Section 3.311. Unfortunately, these factors
provide a plethora of ways in which the VA can deny service-
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156. REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 252.
157. Id. at 252—53.
158. PowerPoint: John Lathrop, Slide Presentation, Review of Atomic Veterans
Demographic Study, at the VETERANS’ ADVISORY BOARD ON DOSE RECONSTRUCTION
MEETING (Mar. 23, 2012), slide 10, available at
http://www.vbdr.org/meetings/2012/Presentations/2-Lathrop_VBDR_Mar12.pdf.
159. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (2006). See Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 70–71 (1997)
(The Court has interpreted this burden as the necessity of submitting a
claim that is “a plausible claim, one which is meritorious on its own or
capable of substantiation. Such a claim need not be conclusive, but only
possible to satisfy the initial burden of § [5107(a)].” Murphy v. Derwinski, 1
Vet. App. 78, 81 (1990). Where the determinative issue involves either
medical etiology or a medical diagnosis, competent medical evidence is
required to fulfill the well-grounded-claim requirement; where the
determinative issue is factual in nature, lay testimony may suffice by itself.
See Grottveit, 5 Vet. App. at 93; Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494–
95 (1992).).
160. See U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Board of Veterans’ Appeals Decisions
Search, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.index.va.gov/search/va/bva.html
(search “radiation exposure and related decisions”) (last updated Jan. 17, 2013).
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connection to a disease. Often, the VA will reject a claim by
citing that the DTRA dose reconstruction estimate does not
support service-connection, even when many of these dose
estimates were calculated based on theory.161 The DTRA
contends, and the VA obviously supports the proposition, that
most Atomic Veterans only received a small amount of radiation
– an amount lower than that required to cause radiological
diseases.162 If the service member was a smoker, the VA will
often deny the claim based on the fact that the veteran smoked,
asserting that smoking may be as likely to contribute to the
radiological disease as service-related radiation exposure.163
In many cases, where a veteran suffers from more than one
type of cancer and/or radiological disease, the claim is denied
without considering the increased probability of radiological
causation.164 In other words, the VA does not consider that the
manifestation of more than one cancer or radiological disease
suggests radiological causation for both diseases. This is in
contrast to the way in which other agencies evaluate radiological
disease claims, 165 as articulated by the Department of Health
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161. EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at 332 (finding that
the “VA (1) has no formal published rules governing this process, (2) does not
thoroughly disclose and discuss what “other” medical and scientific information it
considered, and (3) publishes abbreviated and insufficiently informative
explanations of why a presumption was or was not granted.”).
162. REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 3—4.
163. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) (1998)
characterized tobacco use by service members as "willful misconduct" so as to allow
the VA to deny service-related connection of smoking-related illnesses. The reader
is referred, generally, to the following references that outline the interesting history
and issues related to this legislation: DENNIS W. SNOOK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98373 EPW, VETERANS AND SMOKING-RELATED ILLNESSES: CONGRESS ENACTS LIMITS
TO COMPENSATION (1998); Claims Based on the Effects of Tobacco Products, 66 Fed.
Reg. 18,195 (Apr. 6, 2001) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3); Naphtali Offen et al.,
“Willful Misconduct”: How the U.S. Government Prevented Tobacco-Disabled Veterans
From Obtaining Disability Pensions, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1166 (2010).
164. See, e.g., Ramey v. Gober, 120 F.3d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Farris v. Principi, 4
Vet. App 6 (1993); Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67 (1997).
165. See, e.g., Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7384q(b), 7384s (Supp. 4 2006) (establishing a compensation
program to provide a lump sum payment of $150,000 and medical benefits as
compensation to covered employees suffering from designated illnesses (i.e. cancer
resulting from radiation exposure, chronic beryllium disease, or silicosis) incurred
as a result of their exposures while in the performance of duty for the Department
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and Human Services:
Employees diagnosed with two or more primary
cancers also raise a special issue for determining
probability of causation. Even under the assumption
that the biological mechanisms by which each cancer is
caused are unrelated, uncertainty estimates about the
level of radiation delivered to each cancer site will be
related.
While fully understanding this situation
requires statistical training, the consequence has simple
but important implications. Under this rule, instead of
determining the probability that each cancer was
caused by radiation independently, DOL [the
Department of Labor] will perform an additional
statistical procedure following the use of IREP
[Interactive
RadioEpidemiological
Program]
to
determine the probability that at least one of the
cancers was caused by the radiation. This approach is
important to the claimant because it would determine a
higher probability of causation than would be
determined for either cancer individually.166
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of Energy (‘‘DOE’’) and certain of its vendors, contractors, and subcontractors).
166. Guidelines for Determining the Probability of Causation Under the Energy
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, 67 Fed. Reg.
22,296, 22,298 (May 2, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 81).
167. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311 (2011); VETERANS FOR AM., THE AMERICAN VETERANS AND
SERVICEMEMBERS SURVIVAL GUIDE 79 (2007), available at
http://www.nvlsp.org/images/products/survivalguide.pdf.
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The way in which the claims are assessed is evidence that
the VA does not apply the benefit-of-the-doubt standard of
proof under 38 C.F.R. Section 3.301. The VA is required to
consider all the evidence, and assess whether it is “at least as
likely as not” that the veteran’s disease is connected to the
radiation exposure.167 The claim can only be denied if a
preponderance of the evidence is against the claimant. These
examples are but a few of the common ways in which the VA
uses the factors in 38 C.F.R. Section 3.311 to circumvent the
application of the benefit-of-the-doubt standard under 38 C.F.R.
Section 3.301 to deny compensation for radiation claims.
The number and nature of denied claims is truly
astounding, considering the legislative intent and framework
governing presumptive as well as non-presumptive claims
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adjudication.
In passing REVCA presumptive disease
legislation there was little scientific evidence to support the
legislation – only the statistical data of excess cancer mortalities
related to leukemia among atmospheric weapons test
“[T]he House Veterans’ Affairs
participants was used.168
Committee concluded that there was a lack of definitive
exposure data, and decided to concentrate on the likelihood of
association between cancers and radiation exposures.”169 The
VA was concerned that the REVCA presumptive legislation
would require the VA to compensate for an estimated 32,010
cancers, only a handful of which being potentially caused by the
radiation exposure.170 However, by passing the presumptive
disease legislation, Congressional intent clearly supported broad
compensation. In signing the bill (H.R. 1811), President Ronald
Reagan stated:

The VDRECSA non-presumptive disease legislation has
also been interpreted to support broader compensation for
dioxin diseases suffered by Vietnam Veterans. In Nehmer v. U.S.
Veterans’ Administration, 712 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Cal. 1989), the
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168. See generally G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, ATOMIC VETERANS
COMPENSATION ACT OF 1987, H.R. REP. NO. 100-235, at 8 (1987).
169. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, 101ST
CONG., (Comm. Print 1990) app. E (emphasis added).
170. H.R. REP. NO. 100-235, at 8, 10–11.
171. Presidential Statement on Signing the Radiation-Exposed Veterans
Compensation Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 641, 642 (May 20, 1988).
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Enactment of this legislation does not represent a
judgment that service-related radiation exposure of
veterans covered by the Act in fact caused any disease,
nor does it represent endorsement of a principle of
permitting veterans to receive benefits funded through
veterans programs which bear no relationship to their
former military service.
Instead, the Act gives due recognition for the unusual
service rendered by Americans who participated in
military activities involving exposure to radiation
generated by the detonation of atomic explosives. The
Nation is grateful for their special service, and
enactment of H.R. 1811 makes clear the Nation’s
continuing concern for their welfare.171
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U.S. Federal Courts found that Congress intended the legislation
to compensate veterans for diseases likely associated with dioxin
exposure.172 The court found ample evidence that the “cause
and effect test is also inconsistent with prior VA and
congressional practice: both the VA and Congress have used a
‘statistical association’ standard to grant service-connection
status for other types of diseases.”173 In subsequent legislation174
enacted to further ease the burden of proof for Vietnam
Veterans, Congress characterized the Nehmer court holding:
The court held that VA had erred in two key ways in
carrying out the requirement in P.L. 98-542. First, by
utilizing too high a standard for determining if there is
a linkage between exposure to Agent Orange and a
subsequent manifestation of a disease and, second, by
failing to give the benefit of the doubt to veterans in
prescribing the standards in the regulations for VA to
use in deciding whether to provide service connection
for any specific disease.175
The Nehmer decision is an important ruling for Atomic
Veterans, as many of the congressional statements addressing
dioxin-exposed veterans cited by the court would also apply to
Atomic Veterans.176 Unfortunately, VDRECSA has not been
challenged in the same way by Atomic Veterans.177 Atomic
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172. Nehmer v. U.S. Veterans’ Admin., 712 F. Supp. 1404, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
173. Id. at 1418.
174. Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11 (1991) (codified in
part at 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (2000)).
175. SIDATH VIRANGA PANANGALA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41405,
VETERANS AFFAIRS: PRESUMPTIVE SERVICE CONNECTION AND DISABILITY
COMPENSATION 14 (2010) (quoting STAFF OF S. COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, 101ST
CONG., VETERANS’ AGENT ORANGE EXPOSURE AND VIETNAM SERVICE BENEFITS ACT
OF 1989 35 (Comm. Print 1989)).
176. 130 CONG. REC. 13,154–73 (1984); 130 CONG. REC. 29,551 (1984) (statement
of Rep. Montgomery).
177. See Brown v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, No. 95-7067, 1997 WL 488930, at *3
n.1 (Cal. Fed. 1997). This was a case brought by a group of atomic veterans that
challenged the burden of proof used in radiation cases. The plaintiffs argued that
the regulations issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs in determining
eligibility for radiation exposure shall be held unlawful, and the actions, findings,
and conclusions shall be set aside as they were “arbitrary, capricious . . . and
contrary to constitutional right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006). The case was dismissed as
untimely without addressing the merits of the case.
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178. Nehmer v. U.S. Veterans’ Admin., 712 F. Supp. 1404, 1416 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
179. Id.
180. Flohr 2012, supra note 22, slide 13.
181. EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at app. I-89; see also
Elaine Ron et al., Skin Tumor Risk Among Atomic-Bomb Survivors in Japan, 9 CANCER
CAUSES & CONTROL 393, 398—99 (1998) (finding that skin cancer is associated with,
and can be caused by, ionizing radiation as well).
182. EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at 90.
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Veterans’ claims have likely been evaluated contrary to
Congressional intent since the regulations were promulgated,
denying thousands of Atomic Veterans benefits for their serviceconnected radiological diseases.
The standard by which the VA evaluates scientific and
medical evidence for radiological disease controls the success or
failure of a veteran’s claim. A statistical or “likely association”
has been described as “the observed coincidence in variations
between exposure to the toxic substance and the adverse health
effects is unlikely to be a chance occurrence or happenstance.”178
This is in contrast to the cause-and-effect relationship, which
“describes a much stronger relationship between exposure to a
particular toxic substance and the development of a particular
disease.”179 It is clear that Congress intends for the VA to apply
the lower, likely association, standard to radiological claims,
although the standard has not been challenged and reviewed by
the federal courts.
The way in which the VA Under Secretary for Benefits
denies radiogenic disease claims demonstrates that a heightened
standard of proof, that of cause-and-effect, is likely being
applied to evaluate radiological claims. In other words, by
applying the six factors outlined in 38 C.F.R. Section 3.311, and
assessing these factors, the VA is effectually applying a causeand-effect standard to determine whether a radiogenic disease is
related to ionizing radiation exposure. This is evident, for
example, by the denial of claims for prostate cancer180 (diseases
that are associated with radiation exposure)181 where the claim
asserts a relatively low radiation dose estimate.182 The clear
implication is that the VA places more value in the suspect dose
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estimate and minimizing epidemiological data showing
association between radiation exposure and these diseases.
Thus, the VA requires stronger epidemiological evidence than is
required by VDRECSA to award claims for radiation exposure.
Thus, Atomic Veterans’ claims are subject to a higher standard
of proof than dioxin-exposed Vietnam Veterans evaluated under
the same statutory framework of VDRECSA.183
VI. CASE STUDY: ONE ATOMIC VETERAN’S 24-YEAR FIGHT FOR
COMPENSATION
The scientific challenges outlined herein are best illustrated by a
recent case before the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA).184
A. FACTS OF THE CASE
A veteran was awarded service-connected disability
benefits for diseases attributed to radiation exposure, including
avascular necrosis of the femoral head, breathing problems, and
an increased rating for skin cancer, among other claims. The
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183. In response to the holding in Nehmer Congress passed the Agent Orange
Act of 1991, establishing a new process for the evaluation of dioxin cases that relies
upon the NAS to help review the scientific evidence and establish presumptions
based on the standard of "statistical association" instead of "cause and effect."
Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11 (1991) (codified in part at
38 U.S.C. § 1116 (2000)).
184. Citation No. 0911154 (eDecision Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.va.gov/
vetapp09/files2/0911154.txt (Bd. of Veterans Appeals). Professor Craig Kabatchnick
was long-time counsel for the widow and her husband at the time of the hearing
before the Board of Veterans Appeals and the subsequent decision granting relief.
Professor Kabatchnick qualified one of his students in the North Carolina Central
University School of Law Veterans Law Program, specifically Michelle
Fitzsimmons, as an expert. Given her vast background in nuclear medicine and
physics, especially in view of the fact that Dr. Fitzsimmons earned her Ph.D. in
Inorganic Chemistry from Wake Forest University where her doctoral research
focused on the synthesis and characterization of metal complexes for use in nuclear
medicine, she served as an excellent expert. Correspondingly, some facts and
procedural details may not be found in the citation above. Unless otherwise
footnoted, all facts in this section may be found in the above cited case or are
personal knowledge of the authors. The authors are currently working to garner
accrued benefits for the widow of the veteran in this case. Should the reader like
more information on her case see Craig M. Kabatchnick & Jonathan B. Kelly,
Unsung Survivors: VA Advocacy for the Spouses, Widows, and Children of Elderly
Veterans, 13 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 243, 251–56 (2012).
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claims, initiated in 1980, were accompanied by a radiation dose
reconstruction estimate prepared by the DTRA, and five
professional medical opinions. The medical opinions supported
the conclusion that the diseases were attributable to radiation
exposure. The VA Under Secretary for Benefits denied the
claims. However, on appeal in 2009, the BVA ruled in favor of
the veteran for avascular necrosis and skin cancer. Avascular
necrosis is a radiation exposure-related disease not listed as a
presumptive disease in REVCA, VDRECSA, or 38 C.F.R. Section
3.311.
The veteran was a member of the Marine Corps “C”
Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, whose mission was aborted
due to excessive radiation exposure during Operation UpshotKnothole, Shot Badger. The Claimant was 4,500 yards from Shot
Badger and, after detonation, his battalion was ordered to
charge towards ground zero. The battalion advanced about 500
yards before the winds shifted, and the marines were
unexpectedly subjected to excessive radiation exposure. After
the mission was aborted, the marines remained on-site for an
additional five and-a-half hours and then returned to Camp
Desert Rock (near the test site).
Seven years after being exposed to radiation, when the
veteran was 27 years old, he began to have hip and skeletal pain,
eventually becoming bed ridden at the age of 44. The veteran
was eventually diagnosed with bilateral avascular necrosis of
the femoral head, requiring bilateral hip replacement. His other
skeletal diseases included arthralgia of the cervical and dorsal
spine, and bursitis of the left shoulder. In 1978, the veteran
began suffering from nosebleeds, nasal and facial dermatitis,
basal cell carcinoma and malignant melanoma, and recurrent
lesions of his ears, cheeks, and arms. After leaving the Marine
Corps, the veteran submitted evidence to the VA of
progressively deteriorating health effects due to a variety of
radiogenic diseases, which included fifteen skeletal surgeries
and seven additional surgeries.
The veteran submitted scientific publications and five
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medical opinions linking avascular necrosis (bone death) to
radiation exposure. The radiation, inhaled through the veteran’s
lungs, likely lodged in his bones. Inhaled plutonium
preferentially distributes in the femoral head and lung tissue,
irradiates over a period of years, and eventually destroys the
tissue.185 The scientific literature showed that avascular necrosis
has been seen in the femoral head with the administration of just
a small amount of radiation.186 Additionally, tissue necrosis can
develop when the radionuclide inhaled is either plutonium or
strontium oxide.187 Unfortunately, there is no suitable data
available correlating the dose of inhaled radioactive plutonium
and strontium oxide dose necessary to cause avascular necrosis.
Idiopathic avascular necrosis is extremely rare in healthy
individuals, and most cases are associated with alcoholism or
hypercortisonism188 (neither of which the veteran suffered). A
sizable number of avascular necrosis cases are a result of trauma,
including trauma from radiation exposure.189 Bilateral avascular
necrosis is generally seen with disease processes, including
radiation exposure.190 “The radiation tolerance of the femoral
head is substantially lower than the radiation tolerance of long
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185. James F. McInroy, A True Measure of Exposure: The Human Tissue Analysis
Program at Los Alamos, 23 LOS ALAMOS SCI. 235, 243–44 (1995).
186. UW MSK Resident Projects, Radiation Changes to Bone, UNIV. OF WASH.
MUSCULOSKELETAL
RADIOLOGY
(last
updated
Aug.
4,
2005),
http://uwmsk.org/residentprojects/radiationchanges.html (stating that avascular
necrosis of the femoral head and fractures of the femoral neck have been seen with
as little as 16 Gy of external radiation).
187. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, supra note 53, at 103,
122–23.
188. See Thomas Parker Vail & Diane Beal Covington, The Incidence of
Osteonecrosis, in AM. ORTHOPAEDIC ASS’N, OSTEONECROSIS – ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS,
AND TREATMENT 43, 44 (James R. Urbaniak & John Paul Jones, Jr. eds., 1997); Yoshio
Hirota et al., Idiopathic Osteonecrosis of the Femoral Head: Nationwide Epidemiologic
Studies in Japan, in AM. ORTHOPAEDIC ASS’N, OSTEONECROSIS – ETIOLOGY,
DIAGNOSIS, AND TREATMENT 51, 53, 57 (James R. Urbaniak & John Paul Jones, Jr.
eds., 1997).
189. Michael R. Aiello, Imaging in Avascular Necrosis of the Femoral Head,
MEDSCAPE REFERENCE, http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/386808-overview
(last updated May 25, 2011).
190. Peter G. Harper et al., Avascular Necrosis of Bone Caused by Combination
Chemotherapy Without Corticosteroids, 288 BRITISH MED. J. 267, 267 (1984).
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The veteran had diseases that were not listed as
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191. Mark A. Engleman et al., Radiation-Induced Skeletal Injury, in RADIATION
TOXICITY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 155, 160 (William Small Jr. & Gayle E. Woloschak
eds., 2006).
192. UW MSK Resident Projects, supra note 186.
193. See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR PLUTONIUM 13–14 (2010)
(discussing the publications that supported the veteran’s assertion).
194. See id. at 10, 13–14; see also McInroy, supra note 185, at 244.
195. Jeffrey Bradley & Benjamin Movsas, Radiation Pneumonitis and Esophagitis in
Thoracic Irradiation, in RADIATION TOXICITY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 43, 45 (William
Small Jr. & Gayle E. Woloschak eds., 2006).
196. REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 148, 178, 182, 190, 204.
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bones.”191 The femoral head requires a relatively smaller amount
of radiation to result in avascular necrosis.192
Regarding the respiratory problems, the veteran submitted
scientific publications indicating that both human and animal
studies of inhaled plutonium indicate irreparable damage to the
respiratory tract and nasal passage.193 These studies also
indicated that inhaled plutonium distributed in the lung tissue,
and depending on the particle size and characteristics, remains
in the lungs and continues to irradiate for years.194 Generally
speaking, “[t]he lungs are particularly sensitive to irradiation.”195
Although the veteran smoked cigarettes, the damage caused by
the radiation exposure to the lungs from Shot Badger could be
significantly larger than the damage from the cigarettes.
However, as cited previously by NAS, the error associated with
the internal dose calculations of plutonium refute internal dose
calculations.196 The veteran did not submit medical opinions
with the diagnosis of a specific radiological disease of the lung
and breathing passages.
Additionally, the veteran was requesting a disability rate
increase for skin cancer, to which he was already receiving
service-connected compensation. The requested increase was
based on the progression of the skin diseases and resulting
disfigurement.
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197. Understanding
Radiation:
Health
Effects,
U.S.
EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/radiation/understand/health_effects.html (last updated Aug. 7,
2012).
198. See, e.g., H. J. G. Bloom, Section of Pathology with Section of Radiology,
Discussion on the Changes Produced in Tissue by Irradiation, 52 PROCEEDINGS ROYAL
SOC’Y. MED. 495, 497–98 (1959).
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presumptive diseases under REVCA. Thus, the claim was
assessed under VDRECSA, and 38 C.F.R. Sections 3.311 and
3.303(d). The veteran’s claim included evidence of serviceconnection through the submission of service records and a
radiation dose reconstruction estimate. The scientific and
medical evidence submitted to associate the radiological disease
with radiation exposure included physician statements and
scientific publications. The VA denied the veteran’s claims, as
discussed below.
The veteran’s service records established that the claim was
to be evaluated as a radiological claim. The dose reconstruction
estimate was initially performed in 1978 by the Defense Nuclear
Agency and was revised downward by the DTRA in 2005. The
dose estimate included: (1) total external dose, (2) dose estimate
for skin exposure limited to the face and ears, and (3) an internal
dose estimate. The “total external dose estimate” and the “dose
estimate for the skin” used available dosimeter data, reflecting
gamma, beta, and neutron radiation emitted from Shot Badger.
The internal dose estimate was based on theoretical calculations
for inhaled and ingested radioactive particles. However, the
radiation dose estimates were relatively low.
As for the avascular necrosis, the VA reasoned that the
veteran’s radiation dose estimate was too low to be serviceconnected. The VA based its arguments on the radiation
associated with avascular necrosis resulting from fractional
radiotherapy and radionuclide irradiation. These procedures
expose the whole body to radiation.197 A large dose is required
to achieve irradiation of the bone and the unintended avascular
necrosis because of an uncontrolled environment.198 These
procedures are unlike the inhaled dose of bone-seeking
radioactive plutonium and radioactive strontium to which the
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veteran was exposed.199
By citing the importance of the veteran’s radiation dose
estimate, the VA emphasized the importance of the dose
estimate in their evaluation. However, the VA did not evaluate
the weaknesses associated with the calculations. NAS and the
Committee to Review the Dose Reconstruction Program of the
DTRA concluded that there were several incorrect assumptions
made in the calculation of internal doses.200 Most importantly,
the errors in the calculation were so substantial that they
rendered the veteran’s dose reconstruction estimate
meaningless.201
C. BVA EVALUATION
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199. See id.; Lisa Bodei et al., EANM Procedure Guideline for Treatment of
Refractory Metastatic Bone Pain, 35 EUR. J. NUCL. MED. MOL. IMAGING 1934, 1935
(2008) (explaining that bone pain can be treated with radiotherapy and this
radiotherapy effect).
200. REVIEW OF DTRA, supra note 17, at 168, 169, 182.
201. The assumptions used to calculate the dose reconstruction estimate render
the dose estimate subject to 400% error.
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When the VA denies a claim, the veteran has the option of
appealing the decision to the BVA. If the BVA denies the claim,
the claimant can appeal, sequentially, to the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims (CAVC), United States Court of Appeals
Federal Circuit, and United States Supreme Court. The courts
require the claimant to articulate his/her argument under
specific legal causes of actions that describe violations of the law.
Common issues on appeal against the VA include: clear and
unmistakable error, failure to apply the benefit-of-the-doubt
standard, and failure to provide a “reason or basis” for the
decision(s).
In this case, the veteran argued the following to the BVA: (1)
the VA committed clear and unmistakable error in denying the
claim, because the correct facts were not before the VA. The VA
used the wrong data to evaluate the radiologic effects of
avascular necrosis and the skin diseases. The VA did not
consider the inaccuracy of the inhalation dose estimate, and did
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202. These awards were based on the following statutes:
38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1112, 5107 (2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.309 (2011) (all
statutes establishing a basis for service-connection for avascular necrosis of the
bilateral hips); and 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107(b) (2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.3, 4.118 (2002)
(all statutes establishing a basis for increased compensation for residuals of basal
cell carcinoma of the face, head, and right forearm). Ratings are under the 7800 and
7803 diagnostic code series in the Schedule for Rating Disabilities. 38 C.F.R. § 4.118
(2011).
203. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1112, 1113, 5107 (2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307,
3.309, 3.311 (2011) (delineating the necessity of a particular radiological disease).
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not evaluate the radiation dose estimate for the lung or nasal
passages; (2) the VA committed clear and unmistakable error in
denying the claim, as the VA misapplied the law. The VA did
not correctly apply 38 C.F.R. Section 3.311, as the statutory
factors were not wholly considered in determining service
connection. Specifically, the limitation in the inhaled radiation
dose estimate methodologies and measurements were not
adequately considered, the relative sensitivity of the involved
tissue to induction, by ionizing radiation, of the specific
pathology, the time-lapse between exposure and onset of the
disease and the extent to which exposure to radiation, or other
carcinogens, outside of service may have contributed to
development of the disease; (3) the VA committed clear and
unmistakable error, as the VA failed to properly apply the
Burden of Proof standard, under 38 C.F.R. 3.301; (4) the VA
failed to apply the benefit of the doubt standard, as codified in
38 U.S.C. Section 5107(b) and 38 C.F.R. Section 3.102; and (5) the
VA failed to explain their reasons or basis for the arrival at their
decision for avascular necrosis and claimants breathing
problems.
Based on the evidence presented the BVA awarded serviceconnection for avascular necrosis of the bilateral hips, as well as
increased compensation for residuals of basal cell carcinoma of
the face, head, and right forearm.202 Unfortunately, serviceconnected compensation for the respiratory problems was
denied, as the BVA found that the medical opinion did not
articulate a particular radiological disease.203 This case is unique,
as it is demonstrative of radiation claims that were adjudicated
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under both 38 C.F.R. Section 3.303(d)204 and VDRECSA
regulations.
Notably, in adjudicating the claims, the BVA found, as a
matter of law, that avascular necrosis was not a listed
presumptive condition under 38 C.F.R. Sections 3.309 or 3.311,
but the veteran was able to show entitlement to benefits on a
direct basis under 38 C.F.R. Section 3.303(d).205 The Board found
that:
[A]lthough the evidence of record reflects a fairly low
dose of radiation, relative to the levels discussed in the
studies relied upon by the appellant, the evidence does
support a finding that it is scientifically sound to relate
the development of avascular necrosis of the femoral
head/hip to radiation exposure, as a general principle.
Moreover, numerous private doctors have opined, after
reviewing the Veteran’s medical history and his
exposure to radiation, and conducting examinations,
that in his particular case it is likely that radiation
played a role in causing the currently diagnosed
bilateral hip disability.206
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204. Direct service-connection.
205. The veteran employed the strategies outlined in Combee. Combee v.
Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043–44 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
206. Citation No. 0911154 (eDecision Mar. 25, 2009),
http://www.va.gov/vetapp09/files2/0911154.txt (Bd. of Veterans Appeals).
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This case is an important case for the Atomic Veteran
community and it demonstrates the scientific and legal
challenges associated with non-presumptive, complex radiation
claims. As exemplified in this case, for a radiological disease
claim to be properly evaluated, the claim should include
physician statements and solid scientific literature that associates
the disease with radiation exposure. Since radiation exposure is
linked with a variety of chronic diseases, the VA may not
immediately identify the disease as a radiological disease. For
this reason, even with the proper evidence, these claims are
often denied, requiring further appeal for justice.
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207. Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11 (1991) (codified in
part at 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (2000)).
208. EVALUATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY, supra note 98, at 64 (quoting
COMM. TO REVIEW THE HEALTH EFFECTS IN VIETNAM VETERANS OF EXPOSURE TO
HERBICIDES, VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: HEALTH EFFECTS OF HERBICIDES USED
IN VIETNAM 6–7 (1994)).
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The VA should evaluate radiologic disease claims similar to the
way in which dioxin disease claims are currently evaluated,
because of the similarities in establishing service-connection.
These veterans are similarly situated, as both sets of veterans
face the challenges outlined in Sections III and IV, including: (1)
The lack of knowledge and the inability to measure exposure
during the mission; (2) misinformation communicated to the
veteran and the public about the health risks; (3) the oath of
secrecy soldiers swore, prohibiting them from discussing their
exposure; (4) the long “incubation period” with which these
diseases are associated; (5) the difficulty associated with
assessing exposure dose; and (6) the variability of exposure
experienced by the veteran, which complicates the scientific
analysis of linking specific disease with exposure. In 1991,
Congress acknowledged these challenges for Vietnam Veterans
and passed the Agent Orange Act.207 This legislation requires
the VA to work with NAS to review and summarize available
scientific evidence regarding an association between disease and
exposure to herbicides used in Vietnam.
NAS, through an Institute of Medicine (IOM) committee,
examines and characterizes the strength of the scientific and
medical evidence relating to dioxin exposure into the following
four categories: “(1) sufficient evidence of an association, (2)
limited/suggestive
evidence
of
an
association,
(3)
inadequate/insufficient evidence to determine whether an
association exists, and (4) limited/suggestive evidence of no
association.”208 IOM was additionally contracted to explore
possible links between service in the Gulf War I and a host of
medical conditions experienced by veterans known collectively
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as “Gulf War Syndrome.” The IOM committees conducted the
Gulf War I studies using a similar categorization process that
included: “(1) sufficient evidence of a causal relationship, (2)
sufficient evidence of an association, (3) limited/suggestive
evidence of an association, (4) inadequate/insufficient evidence
to determine whether an association does or does not exist, and
(5) limited/suggestive evidence of no association.”209 If the VA
adopted this type of approach to evaluate non-presumptive
disease radiation claims, the evaluation process would better
conform to congressional intent, current statutes, and applicable
regulations.210
VIII. CONCLUSION
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209. Id. at 65 (quoting 1 COMM. ON HEALTH EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH
EXPOSURES DURING THE GULF WAR, GULF WAR AND HEALTH: DEPLETED URANIUM,
SARIN, PYRIDOSTIGMINE BROMIDE, VACCINES 4–5 (Carolyn E. Fulco et al. eds., 2000)).
210. Specifically, VDRECSA and 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2006).
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Atomic Veterans face an unnecessary number of challenges in
establishing service-connected disability claims for their
radiological diseases. The current legislation, as implemented
by the VA, does not provide an appropriate mechanism for the
proper adjudication of radiation claims. Because these claims
involve the evaluation of complex scientific evidence, the VA
should adopt a new standard under which these claims are
evaluated, similar to the way in which dioxin claims are
evaluated. Implementation of this standard would realize
congressional intent and provide Atomic Veterans with the same
standard of proof applied to dioxin claims.

